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PERFORMANCE AND INCENTIVES IN MUTUAL FUND
INDUSTRY
APOORVA JAVADEKAR
Boston University, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 2016
Major Professor: Rui Albuquerque, Associate Professor of Finance
ABSTRACT
I study various aspects of mutual funds in my thesis. These are divided over four chapters.
The first chapter is an introduction to the thesis and sets out an executive summary of my
research. The second to fourth chapters each deal with a new concept.
The second chapter shows that the sensitivity of an investor’s reaction to a mutual fund’s
recent performance increases with the fund’s historical performance. Put differently, bad
(good) performance combined with a good-history for a fund results in a greater fraction
of capital outflows (inflows) relative to a fund with a poor past history. The evidence is
puzzling as we would expect investors to stick with a fund having a good-history, even after
a single bad performance. I solve this problem using a model with investors of differing
attentiveness. In equilibrium, fund owner’s attentiveness increases the historical record
of a fund. With this mechanism, the model can explain the higher sensitivity of outflows
for the good-history funds. The chapter is important in that it shows that return-chasing
behavior is not ubiquitous. It also provides a clear evidence where the market is slow to
incorporate the new information into decision making.
The third chapter studies the managerial side of the mutual funds industry regarding the
risk-taking behavior of the mutual funds. Mutual fund managers are compared against a
benchmark or with the peers. The employment, as well as investor’s capital flows, depends
viii
on how the manager fares in the competition. I present new evidence in the chapter that
the exposure of a manager to these risks is heterogeneous, and manager’s historical perfor-
mance governs it. The evidence implies that the risk-appetite and behavior of a manager
depends on his historical performance. I find strong support in the data for this hypothesis.
I show that funds with poor historical performance do not boost the portfolio risk to catch
up with the peers if they are lagging at the interim date. In general, the risk appetite of
the poor-history manager is less driven by their interim performance. But the good-history
managers respond to their midyear position and more so during the bull years. The evi-
dence on risk-shifting is consistent with the evidence on how each incentive behaves for
good and poor history managers over bull and bear phases.
The fourth chapter shows that capital movement in and out of a mutual fund is more sen-
sitive to fund performance during periods of high market volatility. I explain this result
using a model where the manager has picking as well as timing skill. A volatile market
presents an opportunity to generate timing value and to that extent produces speedy learn-
ing about managerial timing ability. Persistence in volatility boosts the sensitivity of flows
to performance during such times. Given the counter-cyclical nature of market volatility,
the model predicts that the flow sensitivity is higher during the recessions. Data supports
the model prediction. The chapter provides a clear example when the trade volume (here
capital flows) is linked positively with the volatility. Usually, literature has shown how
the volatile periods slows the learning and hence trade volumes too. But my model indi-
cates that there could be substantial learning going on during volatile times about critical
economics parameters, mainly because those parameters are revealed only during volatile
times.
ix
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
My thesis studies various aspects of mutual fund industry. It focuses on the investor’s and
the manager’s decisions in the context of mutual funds. All the three chapters are closely
related to each other and studies incentives within mutual fund industry.
1.1 Overview of Mutual Fund Economics
Mutual funds industry has grown at an astonishing speed over last two decades. According
to Investment Company Institute (ICI) fact book, total assets held by US mutual funds is
18.2 trillion $ at the end of 2015, up from 4.8 trillion $ in 1997. Moreover, this rise of
mutual fund assets in dollar terms has been inclusive. Roughly 24% of household finance
is managed by investment companies, and 43% of the US households owns median of four
mutual funds. Mutual funds have become a dominant intermediary in asset markets. The
mutual fund industry has been pivotal in changing the structure of the US financial markets
from primarily being directly owned to being intermediated one. Mutual funds own 30%
of the US equity value and 46% of the commercial paper market. 1
Studying capital flow structure and managerial risk choices are important for understand-
ing the behavior of asset prices. Intermediation implies a two-step demand for financial
assets. First, investors invest in a mutual fund and then a fund manager chooses the portfo-
1All the numbers are from ICI 2015 fact book
2lio on behalf of the investors. It implies that asset prices are a function of investor’s capital
flows into and out of the mutual funds on one hand and portfolio choice made by fund
managers on the other. Additionally, mutual fund flows reflect investor’s decisions given
their information set. Because mutual fund data is widely available, an econometrician
can approximate the investor’s information set pretty well. Therefore, it provides a great
laboratory to study the behavioral traits and compare the patterns to the existing models.
At the same time, studying managerial risk choices is important. The remuneration struc-
ture, as well as the investor’s behavior, shapes the incentives for fund managers. Studying
how these incentives translate into the risk choices of fund managers is important from a
regulatory perspective. With this motivation, I explore three aspects of the mutual fund
industry. First is to understand how investors react to the fund performance. The second
chapter studies explore the role of the historical fund performance in determining how
investors respond to the recent performance. In the third chapter, I examine the manage-
rial risk-shifting behavior in response to the incentives they face. In the fourth chapter, I
study how investor’s reaction to the fund performance change as the state of the financial
markets change.
Research in the area of mutual funds gained traction with the growth of mutual fund busi-
ness. Starting from (Jensen, 1968), and subsequent findings of (Gruber, 1996), among
others have documented underperformance by mutual funds compared to the benchmark
index. (Carhart, 1997) documents lack of performance persistence for mutual funds. Taken
together, these findings imply that an average mutual fund underperforms a pure passive
benchmarking strategy and even if a fund outperforms during a particular period then it
is not likely to repeat the performance in subsequent years. In light of this, it was found
puzzling when following papers by (Sirri and Tufano, 1998), and (Chevalier and Ellison,
1997), among others, found that investor chase past winner funds. This behavior is termed
3as Return Chasing. (Berk and Green, 2004) solved this puzzle using the model with de-
creasing returns to the scale. They reasoned that lack of performance persistence is a result
of return-chasing behavior. Their argument is based on the premise of decreasing returns
to scale at the fund level. If a fund is expected to provide a positive return, then investors
invest in such a fund until operating cost per dollar rise to bring the expected return to
zero level. The reverse process results in capital outflow for a fund with negative expected
returns. In equilibrium, every fund is sized such that expected return is zero. This process
rationalizes the co-existence of performance chasing and lack of performance persistence.
(Sirri and Tufano, 1998) and (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997) documented that fund flows
or capital flows respond non-linearly to the recent fund performance. In particular, they
found that flow-schedule (fund flows as a function of recent fund performance) is convex
implying that sensitivity of flows to performance increases with performance. Because
fund flows shapes the compensation of the manager, (Carpenter, 2000), (Chen, 2009),
(Basak et al., 2007), among others explored the impact of this option like compensation
on managerial risk shifting. (Brown et al., 1996) document the evidence that midyear los-
ing funds increase the risk during the second half of the year. (Kempf et al., 2009) show
that employment incentives dominate compensation incentives during severe market peri-
ods and vice-versa. They provide the evidence that midyear losing managers increase risk
relative to leading managers during the times where compensation incentives dominate
and decrease the risk otherwise.
In the second chapter of my thesis, I begin with the premise that the way investors react
to the recent fund performance depend crucially upon the way that fund has performed
historically. Model of (Berk and Green, 2004) for example imply that investors respond
only to the recent performance as they have already reacted to the past performance. But
if the way investor reads new signals depend upon the past performance or if investors
4were inattentive in the past then their reaction to the recent signal depends upon the past
performance. With this view, I explore the impact of past performance on the link between
new performance and subsequent investor’s reaction. Contrary to the common belief that
investors would stay put with a good-history manager even after a single bad performance,
I find that good-history funds are more vulnerable to capital outflows after a bad perfor-
mance. I solve this puzzle using a model with some of the investors being non-attentive.
These investors stick to the poorly performing funds as they fail to pay attention to the fund
performance. On the contrary, attentive investors always shift to the funds with a better
recent performance. The relative attentiveness heterogeneity implies that the good-history
funds are populated dominantly by attentive investors. If such a fund performs poorly,
the investors shift out immediately, generating the observed sensitivity of capital outflows
to a bad performance for good-history funds. The model also implies that a poor-history
fund is over-sized relative to the competitive size and to that extent it underperforms on an
average, given that mutual funds face decreasing return to scale. I test this prediction in
the data and validate it.
In the third chapter, I turn my attention to the managerial side. I explore the role of
historical performance for managerial risk-taking behavior. First, I document that the
probability of managerial firing is affected by the long-term fund performance together
with the recent performance. The evidence in the second chapter shows that capital flow
incentives also depend upon the historical performance of the fund. As both the incentives
for the manager gets determined by the past performance, I conjecture that the risk-taking
behavior of poor-history and good-history funds could be very different. From the data,
I find the same. In particular, I show that the portfolio choice of the poor-history funds
is less driven by the compensation incentives. In particular, a poor-history fund with the
losing midyear position always reduces the risk relative to the a midyear winner. On the
5other hand, a fund with a good-history engages in positive risk-shifting to catch up with
the peers.
In the fourth chapter, I study how the investors reaction to the fund performance is a func-
tion of the aggregate state of the economy or the stock market. I document that capital
flow is more sensitive to the performance during the periods with high conditional volatil-
ity. Traditionally, volatile periods are associated with slow learning due to increased noise
and hence muted reaction. I propose a model where investors learn about different dimen-
sions of managerial skill during different aggregate states. A manager is endowed with
picking as well as timing skill. Volatile periods give the manager an opportunity to use
his timing skills and to that extent, investors learn about one component of the managerial
skill during high volatility periods, generating sensitivity of flows to performance during
such times. To my knowledge, this is the first attempt to solve a model where a manager
has timing skill.
6Chapter 2
How the Historical Performance Shape the
Mutual Fund Flows?
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I study the importance of a mutual fund’s historical performance for deter-
mining mutual fund flows.1 Previous studies have mainly focused on relationship between
recent performance and subsequent fund flows. This relationship is usually termed as flow-
schedule. But very little is known about how the historical performance affects fund flows
in general and flow-schedule in specific. This is the focus of the present paper.
The consensus view in the literature is that mutual fund flows exhibit a pattern of return
chasing: capital moves in and out of a mutual fund as a reaction to its recent performance.
[(Sirri and Tufano, 1998) ; (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997)]. To the contrary, I present a
novel evidence that return-chasing is prominent only for the funds with a sufficiently good
historical performance. For the funds with a low level of historical performance, flows
are weakly responsive to recent performance. In short, the responsiveness of fund flows
to the current performance is largely shaped by a fund’s historical performance and that
the return-chasing is not ubiquitous. These results present a new perspective to under-
stand mutual fund flows. My paper underscores the importance of past performance in
1Fund flows are capital inflows and outflows from a mutual fund and are usually measured as a fraction
of assets under management.
7determination of fund flows.
The Main empirical experiment in the paper is as follows. I study how the link between
time t + 1 fund flows and time t performance depends upon the history of performance
up to time t − 1. The idea is that long-term performance up to t − 1 serves as a prior
about the manager’s ability and time t performance serves as the signal. The objective is
to understand how much of the time t + 1 flows can be attributed to each of the following
three sources: current performance at time t, past performance upto time t − 1, and the
interaction between the two. For terminology, let total flows explained by these three
factors be called fund flows due to performance. My analysis yields five main results:
1. Presence of return-chasing without interaction terms: Without considering inter-
action terms between the current performance and the past performance, my regres-
sion estimates strongly support the hypothesis of return chasing of (Ippolito, 1992)
and (Sirri and Tufano, 1998). For example, a fund within the top quantile of recent
performance experiences roughly 22%-24% more asset growth due to fund flows as
compared to a fund within bottom quantile of recent performance. This result re-
mains valid even after controlling for the stand-alone effect of the past performance
as in (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997).
2. Interaction effect cuts the importance of return chasing effect: The quantitative
importance of the pure return-chasing effect is substantially reduced once the regres-
sion includes the interaction terms between the past and the current performance.
For example, a fund with a 10th percentile historical performance index experiences
only 12%-13% asset growth due to flows after a jump from the bottom to the top
quantile of recent performance. In the regression without interaction terms, similar
jump results in almost twice as large additional capital inflows. This implies that
flows attributable to a pure return chasing effect are reduced by more than half after
8inclusion of interaction terms.
3. Dominance of Interaction Effect: In the regression estimate, the interaction term
between the past performance and every quantile of current performance is statisti-
cally significant and economically large. For example, the coefficient on interaction
between the past and the top quantile of recent performance is around 21% to 26%.
This magnitude is more than twice as large as coefficient on the top quantile of re-
cent performance. For example, a fund with 90th percentile historical performance
index experiences 29% to 33% asset growth due to flows after a jump from the bot-
tom quantile to the top quantile of recent performance. A similar jump for a fund
with 10th percentile historical performance index results in mere 12% to 13% as-
set growth. The difference is attributable to an interaction effect which makes it a
dominant source of flows for good-history funds. This way, my estimation finds an
entirely novel source of fund flows.
4. Flows are sensitive for good-history funds: Interaction terms rise monotonically
over the quantiles of recent performance. This implies that the gap between fund
flows accruing to good-history and the poor-history funds increase with the level
of the current performance. In other words, flow-schedule is more sensitive for the
good-history funds. Because all the interaction terms are significant, it implies that
flow-schedule for a good-history fund is sensitive even at the lower end of the recent
performance. This is not the case for a poor-history fund. For example, a jump from
the bottom to the next quantile of recent performance brings additional flows to the
tune of 0.40% to 0.60% for a fund with 10th percentile of historical performance.
On the other hand, a similar jump brings 4% to 5.5% additional flows for a fund
with 90th percentile of historical performance. This is in line with (Berk and Tonks,
2007). But what is novel is that the good-history funds have more sensitive right end
9of flow-schedule.
5. Stand-alone of historical performance: Fifth, the independent effect of the past
performance on the level of fund flows is strongly positive; a fund experiences asset
growth to the tune of 7% to 8% for having a better history, independent of recent
performance. This implies that the historical performance shifts the flow-schedule
up. This result is consistent with some earlier regression models including those of
(Chevalier and Ellison, 1997). This effect may possibly capture the impact of better
promotions in the following year after a winning year for mutual fund.
(Berk and Green, 2004) rationalizes return chasing behavior for mutual funds. They
present a theory of mutual fund flows with two features. First, capital movement is a
result of new information in the form of recent performance. Second, Gaussian learning
implies that an update to investor beliefs about managerial ability is a function of new
information, completely independent of prior information. These two features together
imply that the fund flows are independent of the historical performance in that model. But
my evidence suggests that past matters for fund flows.
To this end, I construct an equilibrium model with heterogeneous investors. Model is in
spirit of (Berk and Green, 2004) with one modification: some investors are only occasion-
ally attentive. My model has a mutual fund managed by a manager with unknown and
unobservable skill. The manager incurs costs to manage assets, and costs per dollar are in-
creasing in the total assets he manages. That is, there are decreasing returns to scale. There
are two type of investors: Always Attentive (AA) and Occasionally Attentive (OA). Con-
ditional on paying attention, investors are otherwise rational. That is, they process all the
information efficiently to which they pay attention and make optimal investment choices
based on this information: they invest in a fund until its expected returns are non-negative.
Decreasing returns to scale implies that capital inflow drives down expected net returns
10
and vice versa. It is assumed that outside investors have infinite capital at their disposal.
Note that expected net returns, fund size and investor composition are all endogenous to
the model.
This setup has some interesting implications. First, expected net returns for any fund are
always non-positive. If a fund has positive expected net returns, enough capital always
flows into the fund as outside investors have deep pockets. Capital inflows drive the ex-
pected net returns to zero. On the contrary, for a fund with negative expected net returns,
capital outflows are limited to the extent investors are inattentive. This raises the pos-
sibility that funds with high proportion of inattentive investors remain over-sized in the
equilibrium relative to its competitive size2 and offers negative expected net return in the
equilibrium. As such the model replaces the zero expected net return condition central to
(Berk and Green, 2004) with non-positive expected net return condition. Second, OA-type
investors are dominant stake holders in poorly performing funds in the equilibrium. To
see this, consider a fund that offers negative expected net return. Then all the AA-type
investors liquidate their holdings until expected net returns reach to zero. But OA-type
investors may not liquidate their holdings as they are inattentive by construction. In equi-
librium, this leads to poorly performing funds being mainly owned by OA-type investors.
Third, fund flows are less sensitive for poorly performing funds over an entire range of
recent performance. Because OA-type investors are the majority of investors in poorly
performing funds, these funds experience limited capital outflows after bad performance.
On the other hand, even if such a fund performs well so as to offer a positive net expected
return, the required capital inflows to exhaust positive opportunity are small given that it
is already over-sized. This explains the lack of sensitivity of flows for poorly performing
funds. Fourth, investor composition becomes in terms of investor attentiveness differs sub-
2size where expected net returns are zero
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stantially across good-history and poor-history funds as the horizon over which history is
measured increases. This implies that the interaction effects between the past and the cur-
rent performance should become more significant and dominant as the horizon for history
measurement increases. It must be mentioned at this stage that my model explains how
the past performance interacts with the recent performance in shaping flows. But it is not
a model to understand independent effect of the fund’s historical performance .
I employ two indirect tests to confirm the model mechanism that the historical perfor-
mance matters for fund flows due to investor inattention. The first test uses managerial
replacement data. If a fund experiences a managerial replacement, some of the otherwise
inattentive investors would become attentive as managerial replacement generates lot of
soft information in the form of media reports, personal communication from the fund to
investors, etc. This implies that effective heterogeneity in investor attentiveness across
good and poor history funds is diminished after replacement of fund manager. The data
exactly supports this hypothesis. Interaction term is almost insignificant after the replace-
ment event. Second test exploits the structure of the fees. Investors of a fund charging a
higher front load are usually more attentive as they have paid costs upfront and hence care
more about performance. If this is true, then for funds with higher front loads and costs,
the investor population is in general more attentive, irrespective of past performance. This
implies that interaction effects should diminish for such funds. Again the data confirm the
hypothesis.
2.2 Literature Review
The literature on estimation of responsiveness of mutual fund flows to fund performance
is vast. (Ippolito, 1992), using annual frequency, documented that fund flows chase recent
winners. (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997), and (Sirri and Tufano, 1998) further documented
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the presence of convexity in fund flow sensitivity: fund flows are non-responsive at the
lower range of performance but highly sensitive at the higher range of recent performance.
The main difference between my paper and these papers is that my regression estimate
recognizes the important role of historic performance in shaping fund flow sensitivity to
recent performance. (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997) use historic performance as a control,
and fail to consider interactions. The reason to control for the historical performance is that
funds might be promoted by fund families in terms of advertisement budgets etc. which
can elevate the level of flows to these funds. But what I show is that the past not only alters
the level of flow-schedule but also influences the shape of the flow-schedule.
Some earlier papers recognized the importance of other fund characteristics in determin-
ing the level and sensitivity of fund flows: fund age reduces flow sensitivity (Chevalier and
Ellison, 1997). Volatility of performance damps learning and flow responsiveness (Huang
et al., 2012). Young and small funds, also referred to as hot funds, have a steeper flow
schedule as compared to old and large funds, referred to as cold funds (Spiegel and Zhang,
2013). Funds within families having a star performer experience greater level of fund
flows (Nanda et al., 2004). Most of these papers consider the impact of other fund char-
acteristics on flow sensitivity. I show that my results are valid across size and age groups
even after controlling for family effects. I document the impact of historical performance
as a fund characteristic in determining flow sensitivity and level. To that end, my paper
brings out a new and relevant classification of mutual funds.
(Berk and Tonks, 2007) document that repeat loser funds have lower sensitivity at a lower
range of recent performance. Though this paper considers the impact of lagged perfor-
mance in an interactive manner, my paper adds further value to the literature. First, I
characterize the dependence of flow-schedule on the historical performance more gener-
ally and not only at the lower range of recent performance. Second, (Berk and Tonks,
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2007) use one year of historic performance. I show that dependence of flow-schedule on
the historical performance increases with the period over which the history is computed.
Third, (Berk and Tonks, 2007) document that repeat winning funds do not have a substan-
tially different flow-schedule as compared to first-time winners. I document that repeat
winners exhibit more a steeper flow-schedule and also attract higher level of flows.
Importance of the fund’s historical performance has been explored other contexts. For
example, (Khorana, 1996a),(Chevalier and Ellison, 1999), and (Kostovetsky and Warner,
2015) among others document that the risk of fund managers getting fired is inversely
related to the historic fund performance. A quick look at my sample present the same evi-
dence. There are 664 episodes of managerial replacements. 200 of those or roughly 30%
belong to bottom quintile of historical performance and only 12% of the replaced man-
agers belong to top quintile of historical performance.3 Hence, the historical performance
has a clear bearing on the employment incentives. But the other component that drives
the incentives is the compensation which depends on the asset size a manager manages.
Fund flows alter the fund size and shape the level and volatility of compensation for the
manager. But as suggested earlier, there has been a very little exploration as to how fund
flows are influenced by the fund’s historical performance. This paper aims to fill this gap.
There is a large literature on the return chasing effect. Outside the domain of mutual
funds, return chasing is rationalized by (Brennan and Cao, 1997), among others, who ex-
plain positive contemporaneous correlation between net flows and foreign equity returns,
and (Albuquerque et al., 2007), in whose analysis within-country investor heterogeneity
generates return chasing in foreign markets by American investors on an average. Within
the domain of mutual funds, (Berk and Green, 2004) show that investors chase positive
3If the performance did not have any bearing on the firing probability, then these numbers should have
been close to 20%. Hence, these give an indication of the inverse relationship between performance and
firing probability. But some of the replacements could be due to voluntary retirement or promotions, which
complicate the analysis to some extent.
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expected return opportunities, which is rational. But return chasing, together with decreas-
ing returns to scale, leads to zero net returns on an average. Competitive capital provision
with Gaussian learning makes capital flows in that model independent of thr past perfor-
mance. I augment the (Berk and Green, 2004) framework with the presence of inattentive
investors to break the independence of flows and the historical performance to match the
fact observed in the data. (Lynch, 2003) also consider a model with return chasing and
managerial replacement to explain fund flow convexity. But their model counter-factually
predicts return persistence for better funds.
(Carhart, 1997) presents the evidence of lack of performance persistence for mutual funds.
Though (Bollen and Busse, 2005) find some persistence at monthly frequency, overall
there has been a scarce evidence on persistence at medium to long-term performance. I
show that poor-history of performance predicts poor future performance. This is true in
my model as well as the data.
Some papers generate inattention as an optimal response when information acquisition is
costly, for example (Huang, 2007). My paper takes an agnostic view about why some
investors are inattentive.4
2.3 Data and Empirical Methodology
2.3.1 Data
Data for my paper comes from CRSP Survivor Bias Free Mutual Fund Database, covering
a period from 1983 to 2014 at annual frequency.5 Sample selection is in line with earlier
4Though the model in the paper assumes inattention exogenously, there is a potential mechanism that
can generate inattention optimally. If information acquisition is costly, portfolio re-balancing may not be
optimal for investors with low wealth. These are precisely the investors who are invested with losing funds.
This can create a rational inertia.
5Results at quarterly frequency are available on request
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literature.6 I focus on US domestic open-ended equity funds. I exclude sector, index and
specialty funds. Because names or styles may not reflect the true nature of fund, I also
exclude funds whose mean equity holdings are less than 70%. I exclude any funds where
size is smaller than 15 million USD and also any fund whose age is 3 years or less. Many
funds offer multiple share classes to represent various categories of investors or types of
distribution used to market the fund. Following earlier literature, I aggregate all the share
classes belonging to one fund. The size of the fund is sum of sizes of all the share classes,
and fund age is age of the oldest share class. Other variables like turnover, expense ratio,
returns etc. are computed on size-weighted average basis.7
2.3.2 Variables
The main variable of interest is fund flows. In line with more recent literature [(Berk and
Green, 2004); (Huang et al., 2012)], I define fund flows as percentage growth in assets
under management (AUM) due to capital flows.8 In particular,
FLOWit =
AUMit − [AUMit−1 × (1 + rit)]
AUMit−1 × (1 + rit) , (2.1)
where AUMit denotes assets under management at the end of time t and rit is the net return
earned by the fund at the end of time t. There are potential outliers due to small funds
growing exponentially. I winsorize the data at 1% from both the tails.9
The second main variable of interest is the fund performance. I measure fund performance
using two methods: Raw fund returns as well as CAPM-Alpha. For each method, funds
6See data appendix for further details.
7Following (Huang et al., 2012), results are validated with share class level data. This allows condition-
ing the results on fee schedules and investor type which is important for the present paper.
8Previous literature used AUMit−1 as a base in the formula for flows. If a fund loses all the assets, then
this traditional definition would measure a FLOWit different than -100%, which is clearly incorrect.
9Results are robust to winsorization.
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are ranked within their investment style following (Sirri and Tufano, 1998) or (Spiegel
and Zhang, 2013). Though some recent papers use four-factor model of (Carhart, 1997)
to measure fund performance (Berk and Van Binsbergen, 2014) show that CAPM-Alpha
better fits the revealed preferences of investors as compared to four-factor alpha. Use of
raw returns as a measure is not new. (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997) use excess returns as
a performance measure without considering any risk adjustment. (Sirri and Tufano, 1998)
consider raw returns instead. In this case, ranks are computed within each investment style
which ensures that the raw return is compared for similar funds.
The next issue is to compute a measure of recent performance and a measure of past perfor-
mance. At any year-end, recent performance is computed using data for the recent period,
which is the year currently ending, and the index of historical performance is computed
using a window of five years immediately before that recent period. For example, at the
end of 2008, 2008 becomes the recent period, and 2003-2007 serves as the history win-
dow. The recent raw return denoted by rstit is the annual raw return of a fund over the recent
period and the historical performance index using raw returns denoted by rltit is computed
using aggregate raw return over the historical performance window. To compute perfor-
mance using CAPM-Alpha, the following regression is estimated over a k year window
leading up to time t on monthly basis:
riτ − RFτ = αit,k + βit,k × (rm,τ − RFτ) + εiτ (2.2)
k = 1 to compute recent CAPM-Alpha, and k = 5 to compute the historical performance
according to CAPM-Alpha. αit,k denotes the α over the window of length k years ending
at time t. RFτ is the risk free rate during month τ. Rm,τ is the market return during month
τ.
After computing a performance measure, each fund is ranked within it investment category
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and is assigned a historical performance rank and recent performance rank based upon its
recent performance and historical performance respectively. These ranks are normalized
to fall between 0 (lowest) and 1 (highest). I denote normalized historical performance rank
by reputeit and recent performance normalized rank by Perfit.
I compute recent period risk using the recent period’s monthly return observation. A mea-
sure of long-term risk is volatility of returns over history window. Other variables used are
log of fund age, fund size, expense ratio, and turnover ratio. Following (Sirri and Tufano,
1998), I add one-seventh of the front-load and end-load to each year’s management fees
to compute the expense ratio. I also control for overall flows accruing to each investment
style to which the fund belongs.
2.3.3 Summary Statistics
Basic summary statistics are presented in table 2.1. Funds are sorted in to bottom quintile
(Low), top quintile (Top) and middle three quintiles (Med), according to their year-end
historical performance rank. The table also provides overall statistics for entire sample.
The first two columns exhibit the spread in performance across various historical perfor-
mance quintiles. The mean spread between the low and top historical performance group
is sizable in terms of both excess returns (8.4% annually) and CAPM-Alpha (7.9% annu-
ally). This shows that sorting based on long-term performance is a meaningful exercise.
Next consider size. Both the mean and median sizes of funds increase with historical
performance quintile. The mean and median size of the poor-history group is three times
smaller than that of the good-history group. This difference in size is not a result of the age
of funds in various categories or other fund characteristics. Mean and median age across
groups are very similar. In particular, expense ratio, front load structure, turnover ratio and
volatility of returns are all very similar across the quantiles of the past performance. This
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makes it easier to estimate regression models, as most of the control variables need not be
interacted with the past performance.
2.3.4 Empirical Methodology
The objective is to understand how the historical performance affects the link between the
current performance and fund-flows. For example, we want to analyze the link between
performance of 2009 and flows of year 2010, conditional on long-term performance up to
and including 2008. To control for non-linearities in fund flows, as documented by (Sirri
and Tufano, 1998), (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997), and (Huang et al., 2012), I divide the
funds into quintiles according to their recent time t performance given by Perfit. Let Q jt
be the dummy variable indicating that a fund lies in jth quantile when sorted on the basis
of Perfit. I run following regression.
FLOWit+1 = a+
J∑
j=2
φ jQ jit +
J∑
j=2
ψ j
(
Q jit × reputeit−1
)
+γ×reputeit−1 +CONTROLit +εit+1,
(2.3)
CONTROLit denotes other control variables like age and size. Note two important points
about this regression. First, there are three periods. It’s a regression of time t + 1 flows on
time t performance and the historical performance index up to and including time t − 1.
Second, because the model has an intercept we lose the coefficient φ1 on the first quintile
of recent performance. Because the equation identifies the independent effect of reputeit−1
through γ, we lose ψ1 too on the first quintile of recent performance in interaction terms.
Given this structure, we can interpret each of the coefficients as follows: For j = 2, 3, 4, 5,
φ j captures the incremental FLOWit to jth quintile over first quantile Q1. Similarly, ψ j
captures the incremental interaction effect for jth quantile over and above that of the inter-
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action effect on first quantile.10
2.4 Empirical Evidence
2.4.1 Main Results
Results are reported in the table 2.2 and table 2.3. The table 2.2 uses the raw returns
measure, while the Table 2.3 uses CAPM-Alpha. In each of the tables, the first model
considers only the impact of the current performance, the second model controls for the
past performance, and the third model includes the interaction terms between the past and
the current performance quintiles. I discuss the results in a series of hypothesis. All the
hypotheses are formally tested and presented in table 2.10.
Hypothesis 1 (Unconditional Return Chasing)
Fund flows are positively related to recent performance in a model without interaction
effects. Formally, ψ j − ψ1 > ψ j−1 − ψ1 for j = 2, 3, 4, 5.
Consider the first model of table 2.2 and table 2.3. First note that the coefficients on Q jt
are positive and statistically significant for all j = 2, 3, 4, 5. This means that a jump from
the bottom quintile to any higher quintile leads to additional flows. Second, coefficients
rise monotonically as we move up the recent performance quintiles, which means that
improving recent performance leads to additional flows. For example, as compared to a
fund within the bottom quintile of recent performance, funds within second, third, fourth
10There is another way to express this regression. By omitting the intercept and merging the independent
effect of the past performance, we can run following regression:
FLOWit+1 =
J∑
j=1
φ jQ jt +
J∑
j=1
ψ j
(
Q jt × reputeit−1
)
+ CONTROLit + εit+1,
In this case, each coefficient (ψ j) and (φ j) capture the level of FLOW rather than difference between jth and
the first quintile.
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and fifth quantiles of recent performance get 3.4%, 8.4%, 12.4% and 24.1% more flows
annually. Results are similar for the CAPM measure. This result is consistent with the
earlier findings of (Ippolito, 1992) and (Sirri and Tufano, 1998) and others that fund flows
are positively linked to recent performance.
Hypothesis 2 (Return Chasing is valid even after controlling for the historical perfor-
mance)
Hypothesis 1 is valid even after controlling for the historical performance.
A good past performance can result in fund being promoted by the fund family in terms of
advertisement budgets or preference in distribution channels. This can lead to higher level
of flows accruing to more reputed funds for any given level of recent fund performance.
(Chevalier and Ellison, 1997) control for the historic performance and find a positive co-
efficient on the same. To understand the stand-alone effect of the history, I include the
history variable reputet−1 in the second model within each table. We see that the rela-
tionship between recent performance and fund flows is almost unchanged. We also see
a statistically significant and economically large coefficient on reputet−1: 20% for raw
returns and 17.7% for CAPM. This magnitude is comparable to being a top performer
during the recent period. This suggests that high performance in the past elevates the level
of flows for the current period considerably.
But the main focus of the paper is to understand not the stand-alone effect of the past but
the way it interacts with recent performance. In third model for each measure, I include
the interaction between reputet−1, which is a normalized historical performance rank, and
each of the quintiles of recent performance. Including the interaction uncovers the hetero-
geneity in the fund-flow schedules across the good-history and poor-history funds.
Hypothesis 3 (Interactions reduce the strength of return-chasing effect)
The magnitude of additional fund flows attributable to better recent performance is re-
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duced by more than half after inclusion of the interaction effect. Additionally, the stand-
alone effect of the past diminishes.
Consider the last columns within each table. We see that, after considering the interaction
effects, coefficients on recent performance quintiles are reduced by more than half for all
the quantiles: the Q2t − Q1t coefficient loses it significance, while Q5t − Q1t coefficient
stands reduced from 22%-24% to a mere 10%. This indicates that a fund with a poor-
history cannot hope to achieve flow growth by performing well during recent period. The
bottom line is that fund flows attributable purely to a better recent performance are far
smaller once we include the interaction with the past. In other words, the quantitative
importance of the return chasing effect identified by previous papers is greatly reduced.
Similarly, the coefficient on historical performance is cut by more than half under both the
measures.
The next result shows that lost coefficients on stand-alone variables are all transferred to
interaction effect.
Hypothesis 4 (Significance of Interaction Terms)
All the interaction terms are statistically significant. Formally, (Q j − Q1|repute = high) >
(Q j − Q1|repute = low) for any j = 2, 3, 4, 5. Moreover, the magnitude of interaction is
large.
The fact that all the interaction terms are significant implies that an same level of improve-
ment in recent performance leads to higher additional flows to a good-history fund. For
example, a jump from the first to second quintile of recent performance leads to 1.7%-
1.9% additional flows for a fund with 10th percentile history rank (reputet−1 = 0.10)
but leads to 5.5%-6.5% additional asset growth due to flows for a 90th percentile fund
(reputet−1 = 0.90). Moreover, the coefficients on interaction terms are quantitatively large
compared to coefficients on recent performance quintiles. For example, for a fund with
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a 90th percentile history rank (reputet−1 = 0.90), a jump from bottom to top quintile of
recent performance leads to 29%-33% additional asset growth due to flows. Out of which
19%-23% or more than two-thirds is attributable to interaction effect. This implies that
the interaction -effect is far more important than return-chasing effect for a good-history
fund.
Hypothesis 5 (Sensitivity of flows and the past performance)
Interaction terms between the recent and the past performance increase monotonically as
we move to higher quantiles of the recent performance. Formally, (Q j − Q j−1|repute =
high) > (Q j − Q j−1|repute = low) for any j = 2, 3, 4, 5.
Interaction terms represent the difference in the level of fund flows between the good-
history and the poor-history funds at each quintile of the recent performance. The fact
that interaction terms rise monotonically suggests that the gap between flow-schedules for
the good-history and the poor-history funds grows as we move to the higher quintiles of
recent performance. In other words, the sensitivity of the flow-schedule increases in the
past performance. Also because interaction terms rise monotonically over each quintile,
fund flows are more sensitive for reputed funds over the whole range of recent perfor-
mance. (Berk and Tonks, 2007) document lack of flow sensitivity at the left end of the
flow-schedule for repeat losers. But my results indicate that a poor-history fund has less
sensitive flow-schedule even at the right end.
As explained earlier, the economic magnitude of interactions is substantially larger than
the return chasing effect. This implies that differences in sensitivity are substantial too.
To understand overall results together, consider a concrete example. Consider a best fund
with reputet−1 = 0.90 and Q5t = 1 and a worst fund with reputet−1 = 0.10 and Q1t = 1.
Assume that, apart from performance, these funds are identical. Then on average a best
fund experiences additional asset growth of 40.80% due to fund flows as compared to a
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worst fund according to raw return rankings. Out of this 40.80% additional asset growth,
10.7% of the gain or roughly one-fourth is attributable purely to improvement in recent
performance from the bottom to top quintile. This is the return chasing effect. 6.6% or
roughly one-seventh of the asset growth is attributable to the pure past performance effect.
But all of the remaining 23.50% increase, which amounts to roughly 60% of additional
growth, is attributable to the interaction effect: A joint effect of improvement in both
the current and the past performance. This is the main result in the paper. The fund
flow-schedule for a good-history fund is not only more sensitive, but that extra sensitivity
explains most of the flows accruing to reputed funds. These results identify an entirely
new and until now unknown factor that drives mutual funds: interaction between the past
and the recent performance. To better visualize the results, I plot the fund flow schedules
for the good-history and the poor-history funds against recent performance in figure 2.1.
In summary, flows are not very sensitive to the recent performance for poor-history funds.
Sensitivity increases with the the good-history and the poor-history funds, and for the
good-history funds, the interaction-effect becomes the dominant explanation of fund flows
due to performance, and not the return chasing effect.
2.4.2 Robustness And Generality of Evidence
1. Change in market share as an alternative dependent variable The evidence
above is robust to alternative measurements of capital flows. Instead of using fund
flows as a dependent variable, (Spiegel and Zhang, 2013) propose change in market
share. An excellent property of this measure is that the market share changes over
all the funds sum to zero for any given period. The authors show that this measure is
less prone to a possible spurious convex link between recent performance and fund
flows. I run the same regression as in equation 2.3 using change in market share
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as a dependent variable instead of fund flows. Formally, change in market share is
defined as
∆Mktit+1 =
AUMit+1∑
i AUMit+1
− AUMit × (1 + rit+1)∑
i AUMit × (1 + rit+1) ,
The results are presented in table 2.4. All the main results carry over to this new
dependent variable. Column 1 of each panel, where I regress ∆Mktt+1 without con-
sidering interaction effect, suggests a strong positive return chasing effect. But once
we include the interaction effect (column 2 of each panel), two observations can be
made. First, coefficients on the recent performance quintile Q jt − Q1t become neg-
ative, which means that a poor-history fund loses market share with better recent
performance. This is possibly indicative of liquidation out of poor-history funds
following at least a partial recovery of losses. That is, the return-chasing effect is
negative with this measure. Second, coefficients on interaction terms are all positive.
Together with the negative return chasing effect, this suggests that only good-history
funds can capture market share with better recent performance performance. Third,
coefficients on interaction terms are monotonically increasing, suggesting that the
market capture line is more sensitive for a good-history funds. These results speak
even more strongly about the importance of the interaction effect for capturing mar-
ket share or investor’s capital. (Spiegel and Zhang, 2013) identify hot and cold
funds. Hot funds that are small and young have a sensitive flow schedule while cold
funds that are large and old have less a sensitive flow schedule. Similar in spirit,
I identify the good-history funds with sensitive flow schedule and the poor-history
funds with less a sensitive flow schedule. But the good-history funds are not young
and small compared to the poor-history funds. On the contrary, fund size is in-
creasing in the historical performance. A fund belonging to top quintile of the past
performance is roughly three times larger as compared to a fund belonging to the
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bottom quintile of the past performance. On the other hand, the age profile is more
or less independent of the past performance as shown in summary table 2.1. In con-
clusion, I identify another grouping of funds that has vast heterogeneity in terms of
flow sensitivity.
2. Results across age and size categories: The empirical evidence in (Chevalier and
Ellison, 1997) among others, and the theoretical model of (Berk and Green, 2004)
show that the small and young funds have more sensitive flows. Though mean age
across good-history and the poor-history funds is almost the same (around 12 years),
mean size of a good-history fund (top 20% of past performance) is almost three
times larger than that of a poor-history fund (bottom 20% of past performance). If
anything, the results of (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997) suggests that a good-history
fund should have lower flow sensitivity as they are larger. This means that the higher
sensitivity of a good-history funds is a pretty strong result. To show that the past
performance factor is a genuine separate effect not subsumed by age and size, I re-
run the regression across the age and size bins. The results are presented in table
2.5 with CAPM-Alpha and raw-returns measure. A fund with below median age is
young, while a fund below median size is small. In the first and the third column, the
control dummy refers to fund being young and small, respectively. There are three
observations.
First, except column 2, in all the other models, being young and being small in-
creases fund flow sensitivity. This can be seen from the statistical significance of
(Q5t − Q1t)× Control Dummy coefficient. (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997), (Sirri and
Tufano, 1998) , (Berk and Green, 2004) and others have discussed these effects.
But this effect is true for a fund with any level of past performance. Second, all
interaction terms are still statistically and economically significant over all quintiles
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of recent performance. Third, none of the three-way interaction terms between the
past performance, the recent performance dummy, and the control dummy are sig-
nificant, suggesting that interaction terms are valid across all the age and size bins:
young and old as well as small and large. Hence, the interaction effect identified in
this paper is a genuine distinct effect that is not explained by size or age effects.
3. Extended Recent Performance: One possible argument against the existence of
the interaction effect is that it possibly just captures the fact that the evaluation pe-
riod used to compute recent performance is longer than a year. Even then, all the
coefficients should have been split over the recent performance and the stand-alone
effect of the past. The interaction terms would still be zero. As a robustness check, I
re-run the regression model with following changes. I measure recent performance
using two-year window instead of one year. I measure the historical performance
using the immediately preceding four year window. I drop one year from history
window to have matching time frame with earlier regression estimates. Results are
presented in table 2.7. All the results are valid even with longer evaluation period
to compute recent performance.
First, without interactions, (columns 1 and 3), the link between flows and recent per-
formance is strong even with two-year horizon to measure the recent performance.
Second, after considering the interactions, pure return chasing effect completely
vanishes. In particular, the results suggest that improving the recent performance
has no bearing on flows for the poor-history funds. Third, all the interaction terms
(except the first interaction term for raw returns) are significant and explain the dom-
inant fraction of flows due to performance. Interaction terms are monotonically in-
creasing, which means results about sensitivity also carry over.
What this test reveals is that, even if investors use a longer period to evaluate fund
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performance, the importance of interactions is not reduced. That is, this test suggests
that interaction effect is a separate effect and can’t be explained by merely longer
horizon.
2.5 Model
The model modifies (Berk and Green, 2004) framework to include non-attentive investors.
Presence of heterogeneous investors is the main mechanism that generates heterogeneity
in the fund flow-schedule for funds with different past performances.
2.5.1 Set-Up
The model has two types of investors with a total unit mass of which µ fraction are always
attentive (AA) and 1 − µ fraction are occasionally attentive (OA). OA type investors are
attentive with probability of δ < 1 every period. All investors are risk-neutral. Investors
are assumed to have infinitely deep pockets. A mutual fund is managed by a manager with
unobservable and unknown skill α, and it generates gross return as follows;
Rt = α + εt, (2.4)
Investors learn about α by observing Rt. But noise εt hinders learning about α from ob-
serving Rt. Noise has following structure;
εt ∼ N
(
0, σ2ε
)
, (2.5)
Let φt = Et(α) be the estimated ability of the manager, given time t information, which
includes time t performance and the entire history of performance. The fund manager
charges a fixed fee f per dollar managed from investors and has a choice of managing
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money actively or passively. Active management generates gross return of Rt on each
dollar actively managed. Passive management generates zero gross return. With these
assumptions, α can be interpreted as excess return over the benchmark. Denote by qt the
total money a fund has at the end of time t after all the capital adjustments are complete
for time t. This is the total money it manages during t + 1. Denote by ht the fraction of
money that is actively manages during time t + 1.11 The fund incurs the cost of active
management. This cost is a function of actively managed assets and is denoted by C(x) for
managing x dollars actively. To be specific, I assume that C(x) = ηx2, with η > 0. With
this set-up, the investor’s net return per dollar invested is given by
rt = (ht−1Rt) − f − η
[
(ht−1 × qt−1)2
qt−1
]
, (2.6)
Note that rt is generated from investing qt−1. So the cost of management is computed on
qt−1. This completes the basic description of the model. ht is the policy variable of a
manager. In a rational equilibrium, ht, qt and rt are endogenously determined given the
learning technology.
2.5.2 Solution Under Competitive Benchmark (δ = 1)
When δ = 1, all the investors are attentive. An assumption of competitive capital supply
with investor risk neutrality implies the following equilibrium condition;
Et(rt+1) = 0, (2.7)
If Et(rt+1) > 0, then deep pocket investors invest more capital in the fund. Capital inflows
raise per dollar management cost, bringing expected net returns down. Capital inflows
11In a later section, it will be shown that h(.) policy is a function of φ
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continue until Et(rt+1) = 0. Capital outflows on the other hand reduce cost of management
per dollar and pushes the expected returns higher. If Et(rt+1) < 0, then outflows continue
until drop in per dollar cost is enough to restore zero expected net return condition. Under
rational expectations equilibrium, this condition determines equilibrium fund size.
First I solve for manager’s policy ht. The manager’s objective is to maximize revenues
from the fee. Assuming a fixed fee per dollar f , maximizing fee revenue is equivalent to
maximizing fund size. In equilibrium, fund size is determined using equilibrium condition
in equation 2.7. Formally, manager solves
max
ht≥0
{ f × qt} , (2.8)
subject to equilibrium condition 2.7 namely,
Et(rt+1|ht) = 0.
The solution is characterized in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 (Optimal Policy) Manager’s optimal policy is given by
ht ≡ h(φt) = 2 f
φt
, (2.9)
Substituting the optimal policy given in equation 2.9 into equilibrium condition given in
equation 2.7 we get equilibrium fund size;
qt ≡ q(φt) = φ
2
t
4η f
. (2.10)
This expression ties qt with φt directly. Given the solution of qt in terms of φt, fund flows
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are easily computed using equation 2.1. To compute qt+1, we need to know how investors
update skill from φt to φt+1. Let α ∼ N(φt, σ2t ) be the prior at the end of time t. Investors
observes rt+1 and back out Rt+1, given ht, qt and other parameters. This is used to update
φt+1 = Et+1(α), according to Bayesian learning.
Lemma 2 (Belief Update) Investors update the beliefs as
φt+1 = φt +
(
rt+1
ht
) (
σ2t
σ2t + σ
2
ε
)
. (2.11)
This update formula has an intuitive structure. Because for every fund expected net Et(rt+1)
is zero in equilibrium, belief is updated only with a surprise return; that is, when rt+1 , 0.
Additionally, the magnitude of update is scaled for active share. Note that the variance of
beliefs can be updated as follows
σ2t+1 =
(
1
σ2t
+
1
σ2ε
)−1
,
2.5.3 Solution With Inattentive Customers (δ < 1)
When δ < 1, some investors are not always attentive. This means that they do not update
beliefs with every new piece of information, so capital flows may not reflect new informa-
tion completely. This implies that fund size and history of performance are disconnected.
Investor composition is also affected by history of performance. In this section, I solve
the model with inattentive investors and explore other implications of this mechanism in
detail.
Initial Investor Composition: The economy is populated with a unit mass of deep
pocket investors of which µ fraction are always attentive (AA) and 1 − µ fraction are
occasionally attentive (OA) with attention probability of δ < 1. The continuum of in-
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vestors implies that at any point in time (1 − µ) × δ fraction of OA-type investors are
attentive. If required capital to any fund is contributed by every attentive investor equally,
then every µ unit of capital from AA-type investors is matched by (1− µ)δ units from OA-
type investors. This implies that, initially at t = 0, each fund’s fraction of assets owned by
AA-type investors denoted by λ0 is given by
λ0 =
µ
µ + (1 − µ)δ. (2.12)
In general, λt denotes fraction of fund assets owned by AA type investors at the end of
time t after all the capital adjustment for that period. With δ < 1, we have λ0 > µ.
Competitive Inflows and Limited Outflows Capital inflows are competitive even with
inattentive customers. This follows because all the investors are assumed to have infinitely
deep pockets. With at least one attentive investor in the economy, it is assured that, if there
is any fund with positive expected net returns, then capital flows into the fund until the
increase in per dollar management costs wipes out the positive expected net return. But
with inattentive investors, capital outflows may not be competitive. In spite of negative
expected net returns, the fund might not have enough attentive capital to flow out of it to
bring the expected net returns back to zero. To formalize this, let q̂t = qt−1 (1 + rt) be the
size of the fund after realizing rt but before any capital adjustments. Then total attentive
capital at time t within a fund is given by
zt = [λt−1 + (1 − λt−1) δ] q̂t. (2.13)
To see this, note that all the AA-type investors are attentive whose fraction of ownership is
λt−1. Additionally, out of OA-type investors, the δ fraction are attentive. This means that
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the fraction of attentive capital is given by [λt−1 + (1 − λt−1) δ].
Capital Flows and Equilibrium Fund Size At time t after realizing rt but before cap-
ital adjustments, a fund is characterized by the vector of following state variables: Ωt =(
λt−1, φt, q̂t
)
. Let ht be an active share policy that determines the active share of a fund’s
capital for time t + 1. Given this policy and Ωt, competitive fund size denoted by qt(Ωt, ht)
or q∗t for short satisfies the zero expected net returns condition.
Et
[
rt+1|Ωt, ht, qt(Ωt, ht)] = 0 (2.14)
Denote by e(Ωt, ht) ≡ e∗t the competitive capital flows needed at t given Ωt and ht to make
fund size equal to new competitive size q∗t . That is,
e(Ωt, ht) ≡ e∗t = q∗t − qt−1(1 + rt). (2.15)
Denote actual capital flows at the end of period t by et, which can be characterized using
following cases:
• Expected net returns are positive and e∗t > 0:
With deep pocket outside investors, it is assured that whenever e∗t > 0, then et = e
∗
t .
This also ensures that qt = q∗t and Et(rt+1) = 0.
• Expected net returns are negative and e∗t < 0:
Whenever e∗t < 0, then et ≤ e∗t . This holds because a fund may not have enough
attentive capital to support the required competitive outflows. There are two cases
to consider depending upon how much attentive capital (zt) a fund has.
– e∗t < 0 and zt ≥ |e∗t |
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In this case, the fund has enough attentive capital to support required competi-
tive outflows. This again means that qt = q∗t . It also means that Et(rt+1) = 0 for
such a fund.
– e∗t < 0 and zt < |e∗t |
In this case, required outflows are more than available attentive capital, and
only part of required capital outflows actually materialize. In particular, actual
capital flows satisfy et = −zt. This implies that qt > q∗t or a fund being over-
sized relative to its competitive benchmark given Ωt and ht. As rt+1 is decreas-
ing in qt given other state variables and parameters, Et(rt+1|qt,Ωt, ht) < 0 in
this case. Also note that, in this case, capital outflows equal zt and this magni-
tude is independent of ht. This observation will be useful while characterizing
manager’s policy.
Dynamics of Investor Composition Next I describe how investor composition changes
after capital flows. Note that λt−1 fraction of fund assets qt−1 are owned by AA investors
at the end of period t − 1. Because fund returns accrue to all the investors in proportion to
their fund ownership, λt−1 is also the fraction of q̂t (assets after realization of rt but before
any capital adjustment) owned by AA investor. I characterize the dynamics of investor
composition for fund inflows and outflows separately.
Lemma 3 Suppose λt−1 > 0. If e∗t < 0, then λt < λt−1.
Proof. First consider the easy case where e∗t < 0 and zt < |e∗t |. That is, total attentive
capital is not enough to achieve competitive capital outflows. In this case, all of the at-
tentive capital shifts out. In particular, all of the AA-type investors shift out of the fund.
Any remaining fund owners are necessarily OA-type investors. This follows from the ob-
servation that Et(rt+1|qt = q̂t − zt,Ωt, ht) < 0 and no AA-type investor would invest in a
34
negative expected net return opportunity. So we have that λt−1 > λt = 0. Now consider
the other case, where e∗t < 0 and zt > |e∗t |. Now required capital outflows will be achieved.
AA-type and OA-type investors contribute to required outflows in the proportion of their
respective shares of attentive capital. The AA-type investor’s share of attentive capital is
given by λt−1
λt−1+(1−λt−1)δ > λt−1. Inequality follows because λt−1 + (1−λt−1)δ < 1. This implies
that AA-type investors contribute to capital outflows proportionately more as compared to
their ownership. This immediately implies that λt < λt−1 .
Now consider the case of capital inflows. Next lemma shows that any inflow of capital
raises the ownership share of AA-type investors.
Lemma 4 λt ≥ λt−1 whenever e∗t > 0
Proof. First I show that λ0 serves as an upper limit of λt−1. Consider t = 1. If e∗1 > 0, then
AA-type contributes λ0 fraction of it which is same as their existing share of ownership
given by λ0. Hence λ1 = λ0. If e∗t < 0, then as shown in above lemma, λ1 < λ0. Hence
λ1 ≤ λ0. If e∗2 > 0, then λ2 is a weighted average of λ1 and λ0 and as λ1 < λ0, it follows that
λ2 < λ0. On the other hand if e2 < 0, then λ2 < λ1 ≤ λ0. In either case, λ2 ≤ λ0. Continuing
in this fashion recursively, it follows that λt−1 ≤ λ0. Proceeding for one more period, λt
is a weighted average of λt−1 and λ0. If λt−1 ≤ λ0, then λt−1 ≤ λt ≤ λ0. In summary,
because AA-type investors are always more proactive and contribute to both inflows and
outflows more than proportionately as compared to their existing ownership in a fund, any
inflows push up their ownership fraction and outflows reduce it. This formalizes the link
the between investor composition and performance history. In particular, a corollary can
be stated;
Corollary 1 Consider two funds: fund 1 and 2. If φ0,1 = φ0,2 and further that rτ,1 −
Eτ−1,1(rτ,1) > rτ,2 − Eτ−1,2(rτ,2) ∀τ = 1, 2, ..t, then λt,1 > λt,2
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Manager’s Policy The manager’s objective is same as before: maximize fee revenue.
But now with inattentive investors, the size constraint or expected net return constraint is
distorted. In particular, qt ≥ q∗t . But such a distortion is independent of ht. This follows
because, whenever zt < |e∗t |, fund outflows equal zt, and this magnitude is independent of
ht. ht plays a role only in deciding required capital flows e∗t but not the actual capital flows.
This leads to the following characterization of optimal policy.
Lemma 5 (Manager’s Policy With Inattention) Manager’s optimal policy h∗t is equiva-
lent to competitive benchmark: h(φt) =
2 f
φt
Learning Similar to the competitive case, realization of rt leads to an update in the
estimated α for the manager. With inattentive investors, it is possible that Et(rt+1) , 0. In
this case, the update formula is given by equation A.2.
φt = φt−1 +
(
rt − Et−1(rt)
ht−1
) (
σ2t−1
σ2t−1 + σ
2
ε
)
The formula is derived in proof to lemma 2. There are several observations to make.
First note that, through Et−1(rt), learning depends upon level of the past performance φt−1.
It is more likely that lower φt−1 funds are over-sized and for such funds Et−1(rt) < 0. This is
not the case under the competitive equilibrium where for each fund Et−1(rt) = 0. Second,
learning technology has an implicit trade-off for over-sized funds. With the presence of
inattentive investors, it is possible to have Et−1(rt) < 0. For such funds, φt is larger as
compared to a competitively sized fund for which Et−1(rt) = 0 for any given level of rt and
φt−1. This effect works to increase the new competitive size q∗t . But because these funds are
over-sized, required capital adjustment to achieve a competitive fund size commensurate
with φt is smaller in the first place. But note that these two effects are linked. Size increases
the magnitude of surprise rt−Et−1(rt), thereby boosting required flows, but size also cuts the
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gap between new competitive size and current size, requiring less flows. Hence, magnitude
of these two opposing effects is tightly linked. Next I derive the expression for fund flows
analytically, which makes this trade-off explicit.
Fund Flows Consider a fund characterized by Ωt = (φt, λt, qt−1(1 + rt)). Fund assets qt−1
can be expressed as qt−1 = q∗t−1 × (1 + ψt−1), where q∗t−1 is the competitive fund size such
that Et−1(rt|φt−1, ht−1, q∗t−1) = 0 and ψt−1 is the extent of fund size distortion at the end of
time t − 1. Note that in the model ψt ≥ 0. I derive an expression for expected net return
first. This will be useful in the calibration exercise too.
Lemma 6 (Size Distortion and Expected Net Return) For a fund with size given by qt =
q∗t (1 + ψt), expected net return is given by
Et (rt+1) = −ηh2t q∗tψt. (2.16)
With this expression, we can derive an expression for equilibrium fund flows. There are
two cases. Given Ωt, rt is such that the fund achieves new optimum size q∗t . In that case
dollar flows are given by q∗t − qt−1 × (1 + rt+1). Otherwise, in the case where enough capital
cannot flow out, dollar flows equals −zt. In the following lemma, I characterize the flows
in the terms of observables.
Lemma 7 (Equilibrium Fund Flows) For a fund characterized by Ωt, and ψt−1, equilib-
rium flows are given by
FFt =

1
(1+ψt−1)(1+rt)
[
1 + ωt−1
(
rt
2 f +
ψt−1
2
)]2 − 1 If zt > |e∗t |
− ztqt−1(1+rt) otherwise
(2.17)
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There are few points worth stressing. First, by substituting ψt−1 = 0, we get an expression
for capital flows for an optimally sized fund. Second, ψt−1 is implicitly a function of the
performance history. For poor history funds, ψt−1 is likely to be positive. Hence FFt
is history dependent. Third, the trade-off coming from ψt−1 > 0 is apparent now: the
first effect scales down the entire expression for fund flows by a factor of 1 + ψt−1. This
represents the fact that fund is already over-sized and in percentage terms requires less
flows. Second effect boosts the skill update and is seen through ψt−12 inside the brackets,
which increase the flows.
The comparison between fund flows between a competitively sized fund and an over-
sized fund crucially depends upon parameter values, especially ωt−1 and the size-distortion
parameter ψt−1. I calibrate these parameters in the next section and compare the fund
schedules.
2.6 Performance Persistence, Size Distortion and Calibration
(Carhart, 1997), and (Berk and Tonks, 2007) document persistence in performance for
recent poor performers. The model in this paper explains why this is the case: Poorly
performing funds are over-sized and hence produce negative expected returns net of fees
and expenses. In particular, the zero expected net return prediction of (Berk and Green,
2004) is replaced by a non-positive expected net returns prediction in my model. I test this
prediction formally in this section using a methodology similar to (Carhart, 1997).
At the end of each year, I sort the funds according to four-factor alpha computed using a
five-year window. Then I form 10 equally weighted portfolios each representing a decile
of the past performance. I compute the performance of each decile portfolio for each
of the months in the following year where portfolio weights are rescaled to account for
only surviving funds. I repeat the process for each year-end. This generates a sequence of
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monthly portfolio returns for each decile portfolio. Then I estimate a four-factor regression
model for each decile portfolio separately. Results are presented in table 2.11.
D1 (D10) represents the bottom (top) decile portfolio. The results strongly support the
main prediction of the model, namely that of non-positive expected net returns. Bottom
four decile portfolios from D1 through D4 exhibit strong negative four-factor alpha, in-
dicating persistence in poor performance while the remaining decile portfolios from D5
through D10 exhibit close to a zero four-factor alpha. This is exactly what the model pre-
dicts: good-history funds are optimally sized and produce zero net returns on average. But
poor-history funds are over-sized and produce negative net returns on average.
Interestingly, the magnitude of negative returns among the poor-history funds presents a
direct way to estimate size distortion. Under the null of the model, expected net returns
are given by
Et (rt+1) = −ηh2t q∗tψt,
where ψt gives the percentage of size distortion or extent of fund excess size above optimal
size q∗t . Substituting q
∗
t and ht from the model equilibrium, we get Et (rt+1) = − fψt. Mean
annual expense ratio for a fund including amortizing for front- and back-end load is around
1.76%. This is a bit higher than the estimate used by (Chen, 2009) or (Berk and Green,
2004), who use numbers in the range of 1.20% to 1.50% per annum. This is because I also
include exit loads in amortization. From table 2.11, a point estimate of monthly alpha for
a bottom decile fund is -0.137% or on an annual basis -1.64%. Feeding these numbers into
the expression above, we get -1.64% = -1.76% × ψt which gives ψt = 0.93 or 93%. This
is a point estimate for size distortion: an average bottom decile fund is 93% over-sized
relative to its optimal size which ensures zero expected net returns. A similar procedure
gives the size distortion for funds within other deciles of past performance. In particular
for the top decile of past performance, size distortion is close to zero.
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Next I carry estimate other parameters. The purpose of the calibration exercise is to find an
empirically plausible range of parameters that lead to the model-implied fund flows being
close to observed fund flows for funds with different levels of the past performance. Some
model parameters can be directly estimated, and others are estimated using moment fitting
exercise.
I estimate ωt and λ + (1 − λ)δ jointly by fitting the model implied flow schedule with
observed flow schedule. It should be stressed that independent identification of λ and δ is
not possible in this model. I call λ+ (1−λ)δ the attentiveness index for a fund. To estimate
ωt, we need two inputs: σε, which indicates fund return volatility, and σt, which captures
belief uncertainty about the mean level of α or managerial skill. Summary statistics in
table 2.1 show that fund return volatility is almost invariant across the past performance
deciles. Uncertainty in beliefs about α can be measured using cross-sectional dispersion of
alpha. Again, such cross-sectional dispersion in performance is not very different across
various past performance deciles. Given this, I estimate a common ωt across all the deciles
of the past performance but a separate attentiveness index given by λ+ (1−λ)δ for various
deciles of the past performance. In total, I fit three parameters by minimizing the squared
difference between observed and model-implied fund flows. To this end, I use five data
points for the bottom decile of the past and five data points for the top decile of the past
performance. Each point represents a quintile of recent performance and gives data on
recent performance and fund flows. Then I minimize the mean squared error computed
from the difference between model-implied and observed flows. Estimated parameters are
ωt = 0.068, attentiveness index for a good-history fund is λhigh + (1 − λhigh)δhigh = 0.490
and that for a poor-history funds is λlow + (1 − λlow)δlow = 0.201. The estimated value for
ωt looks reasonable.(Berk and Green, 2004) use a value of ωt = 0.0955. Using a similar
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procedure as in (Berk and Green, 2004),12 a direct estimate of ωt in my sample is around
0.18, which generates an attentiveness index of 0.20 for a poor-history funds and 0.42 for
a good-history funds. This puts credence on the estimated value for an attentiveness index
estimated earlier. This is the first paper to my knowledge to estimate the extent of investor
inattention in the context of mutual funds. Parameters suggests that half of the capital is
attentive for funds with a good past performance and only 20% for the funds with a poor
past performance.
Using these parameter estimates, I plot fund-flow schedules implied by the model for good
and poor history funds. For these estimated parameter values, the model reproduces the
empirical fact that flow-schedule sensitivity is increasing in the historical performance. In
particular, the boosting effect in learning coming from Et(rt+1) being negative is dominated
by the effect that fund is already over-sized and requires less capital adjustment, which
results in the model generating the desired flow schedule as in the data. The results are
presented in figure 2.2.
2.7 Three Thought Experiments
In this section, I carry out three experiments to validate model mechanism. The model
predicts that the funds differ in terms of the type of investors who own them as a function
of its past performance. This heterogeneity in the investor base explains heterogeneous
fund flow patterns. Statistically, this mechanism implies that fund flows are determined
12First parameter to estimate is σε which is the volatility of Rt conditional on α. In the model, α denotes
managerial ability. In the data, both raw fund returns and factor model explain the fund flow patterns or
serve as potential measures of managerial ability. I use raw fund returns as a measure of ability to estimate
ωt. Calculations are similar with CAPM-α or 4-factor α. (Berk and Green, 2004) use empirical fund return
volatility to match signal volatility σε. Mean annual volatility of fund excess returns is around 17.37% in the
sample. Second parameter to estimate is σt which indicates uncertainty in beliefs about mean level of α or
ability. I use cross-sectional dispersion in raw returns computed using 5-yearly window to estimate it. Using
this measure, σt is 8.62% within whole sample. Using these numbers, ωt =
σ2t
σ2t +σ
2
ε
=0.18. Using excess
returns, CAPM-α and 4-factor α, ωt is around 0.36, 0.30 and 0.32 respectively using similar computation.
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by the interaction between the past and the current performance. Experiments in this
section directly test the implications that arise from the conjectured behavior of inattentive
investors under some situations.
1. Managerial Replacement and Impact of Reputation One test of the proposed
mechanism (namely the presence of inattentive investors) is to identify events that
would draw attention of otherwise inattentive investors and then to compare the re-
sults for the subsample of data with such events. Managerial replacement presents
such a natural experiment. Media reports, communication from the fund to investors
and other soft information can grab the attention of at least some of the otherwise
non-attentive investors. Once these investors pay attention, they react to all the infor-
mation that has accumulated since they last followed the fund’s performance. This
re-balancing from non-attentive investors breaks or weakens the link between in-
vestor composition and historic performance. With such re-balancing, we should
see reduced importance of interaction terms as the overall level of attentiveness
among the investors increases following the replacement episode. In other words,
effective heterogeneity across funds with different past performances reduces after
the replacement episode and this should cut the influence of the past performance
in determining the shape of flow-schedule. To test this conjecture, I construct the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6 If there is a managerial replacement during t, then interaction be-
tween time t performance (Per fit) and the past performance up to t − 1 (reputeit−1)
is weaker while explaining fund flows during t + 1.
To analyze flows during t+1, I divide the sample into two subsamples: One subsam-
ple with funds that experience a manager replacement either at time t +1 or t and the
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other consisting of funds with no replacement during either t + 1 or t. The reason to
include t + 1 is that with a yearly horizon, replacements occurring during the early
part of t+1 can influence the flows during t+1. I run the following regression model
on the two subsamples separately.
FLOWit+1 = a+b1Per fit+b2 (Per fit × reputeit−1)+b3×reputeit−1+CONTROLit+εit+1
(2.18)
As the focus is on understanding the impact of managerial replacement on inter-
action terms rather than on the non-linear nature of fund flow-schedule, I use nor-
malized rank variables: namely Perft and reputet−1 instead of analyzing interaction
within each quintile. Results are presented in table 2.8. Panel A uses raw returns,
and panel B uses CAPM-α to rank the funds. First model within each panel uses
the subsample with replacement and the second model uses the subsample with-
out replacement. Data precisely support the conjecture. Interaction term lose its
significance within the subsample with managerial replacement during the previous
period.
First note that, in both the subsamples, the link between flows and recent perfor-
mance is similar: Perft has a strongly positive coefficient in both the samples. This
is important as we are assured that other characteristics of the regression estimates
are not significantly different during two subsamples, which would make compari-
son very difficult. Now consider the interaction effect. As expected, the significance
of interaction effects is much weaker within the sample with manager replacement.
According to the CAPM model, interaction is not significant even at the a 10%
level of significance. For the raw returns model, interaction effect is reduced by a
third in magnitude, and it is significant only at around 10% level of significance.
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These results lend support to the idea that lack of attentive investors within the
poor-history funds causes lack of sensitivity in flow schedule for such funds dur-
ing non-replacement periods. But managerial replacement increases the average
attentiveness within the investor population. This means that even the funds with
poor-history have sensitive flow schedule after the managerial replacement.
2. Fee Structure and Impact of Reputation Investors paying higher fees or loads will
in general be more attentive. If this is true, then the interaction between the past and
the current performance should not be as important with funds with lower loads or
fees. To this end, I sort the funds into quintiles based on front loads. Front load is
a one-time expense and is more visible in nature. I re-run the regression in equa-
tion 2.18 separately on the subsample of funds within the top and bottom quintile
sorted on front load. The reason for considering top and bottom quintiles is that
middle quintiles of front load have very little variation. The results are presented in
table 2.9. There are two results. First, coefficient on expense ratio is negative for
low front load funds and positive for high front-load funds.13 Second, as conjec-
tured, interaction terms are weaker or insignificant for funds with high front loads.
3. Interaction Effects With Shorter Reputation Window As the model suggests, a
longer sequence of poor (good) performance generates more heterogeneity across
the poor and the good history funds in terms of type of investors who own them.
A simple way to test this prediction is to re-run the regression model in equation
2.3 with a shorter history window, say three years or one year and then to compare
the strength of the interaction effects. According to the model, it should diminish.
13One possible reason for this sign switch is that, when investors are on the lookout for cheaper funds,
they tend to choose the cheapest funds. But when they are on the lookout for thematic investments and are
ready to pay extra fees or loads, then they may chase high fee funds with a possibly erroneous belief that
high loads imply higher expected net returns.
44
To this end, I re-run the regression model using one year history window preceding
that of recent performance instead of five-year window used earlier. Results are
presented in table 2.6.
As can be seen, interaction terms are substantially smaller as compared to the in-
teraction terms with the longer history window. This is true for both Flowit+1 and
∆Mktit+1. For example, none of the interaction terms on second quintile are signif-
icant. These were statistically and economically significant with the longer history
window. Even for the top quintile, there is substantial reduction in the strength of
coefficients. These results indicate that interaction effects strengthen with the his-
tory horizon, reflecting the fact that a longer horizon allows investor composition to
be more heterogeneous across reputed and non-reputed funds.
2.8 Conclusion
This paper presents a novel fact that mutual fund flow sensitivity to recent performance
is weak for funds with poor past performance. Additionally, for the good-history funds,
the bulk of the flows are attributable to the interactions between the past and the cur-
rent performance. I rationalize this heterogeneity in flow sensitivity using the presence
of the inattentive investors. These investors fail to shift out of poorly performing funds
thereby concentrating in poorly performing funds. This simple mechanism has many im-
portant implications. First, investor attentiveness and with it the flow sensitivity both in-
creases in the fund’s historical performance. Second, not enough capital flows out of a
fund with poor-history if required as most investors are inattentive which implies that the
poor-history funds are above the size implied by the competitive equilibrium. Decreasing
returns to scale together with the second implication results in negative expected returns
for the poor-history funds.
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I calibrate the model and find that roughly half of the capital is attentive for good-history
funds but only 20% for the poor-history funds. I also estimate that the poor-history funds
are on an average twice their competitive size. This paper is the first to my knowledge
to quantify the attentiveness parameter using an equilibrium model. I also conduct three
experiments to test the model mechanism. I find that the past performance has less bearing
on flow sensitivity for funds experiencing managerial replacements, and for the funds with
high front loads.
46
Table 2.2: Historical Raw Performance and Fund Flows
Table presents estimation of the equation 2.3 with FLOWit as the dependent variable de-
fined in the equation 2.1. Q jit = 1 if recent performance at time t denoted by Perfit lies in
the jth quintile. reputeit−1 denotes the normalized past performance index computed using
a five-year window ending at the year t − 1. Panel A uses raw return measure to sort the
funds. Control variables include half yearly performance during t + 1 (Perf-Halft+1), loga-
rithm of the fund size, logarithm of fund age plus one, turnover, expense ratio, risk, which
is computed using monthly return data for the period t, and category flow for time t + 1,
which is the asset weighted growth of the investment category to which a fund belongs.
All the specifications have time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level
to control for serial correlation within each panel. Standard errors are in parenthesis and
*, ** and *** denote significance of coefficient at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. All
the models have an intercept. Q1 is the base group and hence effects of Q j are incremental
over Q1. Similarly interactions effects for Q j × repute are incremental over Q1 × repute.
Table 2.2: Historical Raw Performance and Fund Flows
Panel A: Raw Returns
Q2t − Q1t 0.034*** 0.037*** 0.013
(0.006) (0.006) (0.011)
Q3t − Q1t 0.084*** 0.090*** 0.032***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.012)
Q4t − Q1t 0.124*** 0.130*** 0.050***
Continued on next page
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Table 2.2 – Continued from previous page
Panel A: Raw Returns
(0.007) (0.007) (0.014)
Q5t − Q1t 0.241*** 0.246*** 0.107***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.018)
reputet−1 0.202*** 0.083***
(0.013) (0.015)
reputet−1 × (Q2t − Q1t) 0.043**
(0.019)
reputet−1 × (Q3t − Q1t) 0.108***
(0.021)
reputet−1 × (Q4t − Q1t) 0.149***
(0.026)
reputet−1 × (Q5t − Q1t) 0.261***
(0.033)
Perf-Half(t+1) 0.201*** 0.202*** 0.201***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Risk (t) -0.892*** -0.922*** -0.887***
(0.251) (0.250) (0.251)
Size (t) -0.006*** -0.017*** -0.017***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Expense Ratio (t) -0.183 0.062 -0.016
Continued on next page
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Table 2.2 – Continued from previous page
Panel A: Raw Returns
(0.686) (0.702) (0.696)
Age (t) -0.041*** -0.022*** -0.022***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Category Flow (t+1) 0.234*** 0.226*** 0.218***
(0.066) (0.065) (0.064)
Intercept 0.056 -0.067* -0.008
(0.037) (0.035) (0.035)
N 11879 11879 11879
Adj. R-sq 0.176 0.208 0.215
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Table 2.3: Historical CAPM-Alpha and Fund Flows
Table presents estimation of the equation 2.3 with FLOWit as the dependent variable de-
fined in the equation 2.1. Q jit = 1 if recent performance at time t denoted by Perfit lies in
the jth quintile. reputeit−1 denotes the normalized past performance index computed using
a five-year window ending at the year t − 1. Panel uses CAPM-Alpha to sort the funds.
Control variables include half yearly performance during t + 1 (Perf-Halft+1), logarithm of
the fund size, logarithm of fund age plus one, turnover, expense ratio, risk, which is com-
puted using monthly return data for the period t, and category flow for time t + 1, which
is the asset weighted growth of the investment category to which a fund belongs. All the
specifications have time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level to
control for serial correlation within each panel. Standard errors are in parenthesis and *,
** and *** denote significance of coefficient at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. All
the models have an intercept. Q1 is the base group and hence effects of Q j are incremental
over Q1. Similarly interactions effects for Q j × repute are incremental over Q1 × repute.
Table 2.3: Historical CAPM-Alpha and Fund Flows
Panel A: Raw Returns
Q2t − Q1t 0.041*** 0.045*** 0.012
(0.006) (0.006) (0.011)
Q3t − Q1t 0.087*** 0.091*** 0.038***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.013)
Continued on next page
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Table 2.3 – Continued from previous page
Panel A: Raw Returns
Q4t − Q1t 0.134*** 0.137*** 0.061***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.014)
Q5t − Q1t 0.226*** 0.225*** 0.109***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.019)
reputet−1 0.177*** 0.069***
(0.013) (0.015)
reputet−1 × (Q2t − Q1t) 0.061***
(0.020)
reputet−1 × (Q3t − Q1t) 0.102***
(0.023)
reputet−1 × (Q5t − Q1t) 0.143***
(0.026)
reputet−1 × (Q5t − Q1t) 0.216***
(0.033)
Perf-Half(t+1) 0.198*** 0.202*** 0.202***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Risk (t) -0.590** -0.467* -0.440*
(0.250) (0.251) (0.252)
Size (t) -0.006*** -0.016*** -0.016***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Continued on next page
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Table 2.3 – Continued from previous page
Panel A: Raw Returns
Expense Ratio (t) -0.013 0.278 0.237
(0.696) (0.709) (0.708)
Age (t) -0.042*** -0.025*** -0.025***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Category Flow (t+1) 0.233*** 0.227*** 0.222***
(0.066) (0.065) (0.065)
Intercept 0.042 -0.076** -0.024
(0.036) (0.035) (0.035)
N 11879 11879 11879
Adj. R-sq 0.164 0.189 0.193
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Table 2.4: Reputation and Market Share
Table presents estimation of the following regression equation
∆Mktit+1 = a+
J∑
j=2
φ jQ jit +
J∑
j=2
ψ j
(
Q jit × reputeit−1
)
+ (γ× reputeit−1)+CONTROLit +εit+1
Dependent variable is defined as
∆Mktit+1 =
qit+1∑
i qit+1
− qit × (1 + rit+1)∑
i qit × (1 + rit+1)
Q jit = 1 if recent performance at time t denoted by Perft lies in the jth quintile. reputeit−1
denotes the normalized past performance index computed using a five-year window ending
at the year t−1. Panel A and B uses raw return measure and CAPM-Alpha to sort the funds.
Control variables include half yearly performance during t + 1 (Perf-Halft+1), logarithm
of the fund size, logarithm of fund age plus one, turnover, expense ratio, risk, which is
computed using monthly return data for the period t, and category flow for time t + 1,
which is the asset weighted growth of the investment category to which a fund belongs.
All the specifications have time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level
to control for serial correlation within each panel. Standard errors are in parenthesis and
*, ** and *** denote significance of coefficient at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. All
the models have an intercept. Q1 is the base group and hence effects of Q j are incremental
over Q1. Similarly interactions effects for Q j × repute are incremental over Q1 × repute.
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Table 2.4: Reputation and Market Share
Panel A: Raw Returns Panel B: CAPM-Alpha
Q2t − Q1t 0.042 -0.125*** 0.061** -0.085*
(0.026) (0.046) (0.026) (0.044)
Q3t − Q1t 0.107*** -0.186** 0.131*** -0.130*
(0.032) (0.079) (0.036) (0.071)
Q4t − Q1t 0.258*** -0.158*** 0.276*** -0.110**
(0.033) (0.051) (0.035) (0.053)
Q5t − Q1t 0.510*** -0.167** 0.490*** -0.149**
(0.046) (0.070) (0.047) (0.069)
reputet−1 -0.048 -0.023
(0.060) (0.066)
reputet−1 × (Q2t − Q1t) 0.326*** 0.297***
(0.098) (0.088)
reputet−1 × (Q3t − Q1t) 0.577*** 0.517***
(0.169) (0.166)
reputet−1 × (Q4t − Q1t) 0.811*** 0.753***
(0.124) (0.121)
reputet−1 × (Q5t − Q1t) 1.309*** 1.195***
(0.186) (0.186)
Perf-Half(t+1) 0.761*** 0.760*** 0.706*** 0.717***
(0.068) (0.067) (0.068) (0.068)
Continued on next page
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Panel A: Raw Returns Panel B: CAPM Alpha
Risk(t) -2.239* -2.212* -1.182 -0.587
(1.242) (1.235) (1.263) (1.284)
Size(t) 0.004 -0.031*** 0.003 -0.029**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
Expense Ratio(t) 0.274 0.499 0.559 1.210
(3.332) (3.276) (3.387) (3.372)
Age(t) -0.101*** -0.049* -0.103*** -0.054**
(0.029) (0.026) (0.029) (0.026)
Category Flow(t+1) -0.579* -0.655** -0.588** -0.651**
(0.298) (0.298) (0.297) (0.300)
Intercept -0.189 -0.217 -0.220 -0.305
(0.240) (0.223) (0.231) (0.221)
N 11715 11715 11715 11715
Adj R2 0.062 0.088 0.055 0.077
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Table 2.5: Fund Flows Across Age and Size Bins
Table presents estimation results where I interact age (young vs old) and size (small vs
large) dummies to the 2.3. Dependent variable is as defined in equation 2.1. Q jit = 1 if
recent performance at time t denoted by Perft lies in the jth quintile. reputeit−1 denotes the
normalized past performance index computed using a five-year window ending at the year
t − 1. A fund is young (small) at time t, if at the end of t, fund age (size) is below median
age (size) within same investment objective. Control dummy (ctrl dum) indicates whether
fund is young or small. Panel A and B uses raw return measure and CAPM-Alpha to sort
the funds. Control variables include half yearly performance during t + 1 (Perf-Halft+1),
logarithm of the fund size, logarithm of fund age plus one, turnover, expense ratio, risk,
which is computed using monthly return data for the period t, and category flow for time
t + 1, which is the asset weighted growth of the investment category to which a fund
belongs. All the specifications have time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at
the fund level to control for serial correlation within each panel. Standard errors are in
parenthesis and *, ** and *** denote significance of coefficient at 10%, 5% and 1% level
respectively. All the models have an intercept. Q1 is the base group and hence effects of
Q j are incremental over Q1. Similarly interactions effects for Q j × repute are incremental
over Q1 × repute.
Table 2.5: Fund-Flows Across Age and Size Bins
Panel A: Returns Panel B: Alpha
Ctrl Dum Young=1 Small=1 Young=1 Small=1
Q2t − Q1t 0.012 0.032** 0.011 0.013
(0.012) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013)
Continued on next page
57
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Panel A: Returns Panel B: Alpha
Ctrl Dum Young=1 Small=1 Young=1 Small=1
Q3t − Q1t 0.025* 0.043** 0.028** 0.039**
(0.014) (0.018) (0.014) (0.019)
Q4t − Q1t 0.050*** 0.044*** 0.039*** 0.059***
(0.014) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017)
Q5t − Q1t 0.066*** 0.075*** 0.064*** 0.080***
(0.018) (0.021) (0.019) (0.022)
(Q2t − Q1t)×Ctrl Dum 0.001 -0.033 0.003 0.003
(0.025) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024)
(Q3t − Q1t)×Ctrl Dum 0.018 -0.026 0.028 0.028
(0.027) (0.024) (0.032) (0.032)
(Q4t − Q1t)×Ctrl Dum -0.002 -0.004 0.043 0.043
(0.029) (0.029) (0.033) (0.033)
(Q5t − Q1t)×Ctrl Dum 0.116*** 0.047 0.128*** 0.128***
(0.039) (0.033) (0.041) (0.041)
reputet−1 0.087*** 0.090*** 0.071*** 0.066***
(0.019) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018)
reputet−1 × (Q2t − Q1t) 0.055** 0.018 0.054** 0.062***
(0.022) (0.026) (0.023) (0.024)
reputet−1 × (Q3t − Q1t) 0.116*** 0.075*** 0.096*** 0.105***
(0.025) (0.028) (0.025) (0.030)
reputet−1 × (Q4t − Q1t) 0.115*** 0.129*** 0.132*** 0.123***
Continued on next page
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Table 2.5 – Continued from previous page
Panel A: Returns Panel B: Alpha
Ctrl Dum Young=1 Small=1 Young=1 Small=1
(0.026) (0.028) (0.025) (0.027)
reputet−1 × (Q5t − Q1t) 0.268*** 0.272*** 0.236*** 0.230***
(0.035) (0.038) (0.036) (0.035)
reputet−1 × (Q2t − Q1t)×Ctrl Dum -0.028 0.038 0.014 0.014
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
reputet−1 × (Q3t − Q1t)×Ctrl Dum -0.022 0.083* 0.017 0.017
(0.046) (0.045) (0.053) (0.053)
reputet−1 × (Q4t − Q1t)×Ctrl Dum 0.083 0.088 0.031 0.031
(0.054) (0.061) (0.055) (0.055)
reputet−1 × (Q5t − Q1t)×Ctrl Dum -0.028 0.042 -0.067 -0.067
(0.068) (0.065) (0.067) (0.067)
Ctrl Dum -0.010 -0.001 -0.026 -0.010
(0.019) (0.017) (0.019) (0.018)
Ctrl Dum ×reputet−1 -0.006 -0.035 -0.001 -0.001
(0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Perf-Half(t+1) 0.204*** 0.205*** 0.204*** 0.205***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Risk(t) -0.916*** -0.925*** -0.356 -0.365
(0.254) (0.252) (0.253) (0.253)
Size(t) -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Continued on next page
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Panel A: Returns Panel B: Alpha
Ctrl Dum Young=1 Small=1 Young=1 Small=1
Expense Ratio(t) -0.113 -0.098 0.126 0.113
(0.705) (0.699) (0.722) (0.718)
Age(t) -0.013* -0.022*** -0.017** -0.025***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006)
Category Flow(t+1) 0.355*** 0.355*** 0.358*** 0.357***
(0.055) (0.055) (0.056) (0.057)
Intercept -0.039 -0.024 -0.052 -0.034
(0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037)
N 11780 11780 11780 11780
Adj R2 0.228 0.225 0.203 0.201
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Table 2.6: Short Horizon of Reputation and Fund Flows
Table presents estimation results for the equation 2.3 with Flowit and ∆Mktit as dependent
variables in Panel A and B respectively and where past performance index is computed
using one-year window instead of five years. Q jit = 1 if recent performance at time t
denoted by Perft lies in the jth quintile. For each dependent variable, I use raw-returns
(Raw) and Capm-Alpha (Alpha) to measure the performance. Control variables include
half yearly performance during t+1 (Perf-Halft+1), logarithm of the fund size, logarithm of
fund age plus one, turnover, expense ratio, risk, which is computed using monthly return
data for the period t, and category flow for time t + 1, which is the asset weighted growth
of the investment category to which a fund belongs. All the specifications have time fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level to control for serial correlation
within each panel. Standard errors are in parenthesis and *, ** and *** denote significance
of coefficient at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. All the models have an intercept. Q1
is the base group and hence effects of Q j are incremental over Q1. Similarly interactions
effects for Q j × repute are incremental over Q1 × repute.
Table 2.6: Short Horizon of Reputation and Fund Flows
Panel A: Flowt+1 Panel B: ∆Mktt+1
Raw Alpha Raw Alpha
Q2t − Q1t 0.024** 0.046*** 0.001 0.047
(0.011) (0.012) (0.046) (0.050)
Q3t − Q1t 0.050*** 0.066*** -0.077 -0.026
(0.013) (0.014) (0.070) (0.064)
Q4t − Q1t 0.061*** 0.077*** 0.021 0.112**
Continued on next page
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Panel A: FLOWt+1 Panel B: ∆Mktt+1
Raw Alpha Raw Alpha
(0.014) (0.013) (0.050) (0.054)
Q5t − Q1t 0.123*** 0.150*** 0.059 0.101
(0.015) (0.016) (0.061) (0.062)
reputet−1 0.100*** 0.117*** 0.108** 0.143***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.049) (0.052)
reputet−1 × (Q2t − Q1t) 0.018 -0.012 0.083 0.027
(0.020) (0.021) (0.090) (0.086)
reputet−1 × (Q3t − Q1t) 0.063*** 0.045* 0.358** 0.308**
(0.022) (0.025) (0.150) (0.137)
reputet−1 × (Q4t − Q1t) 0.115*** 0.095*** 0.459*** 0.314***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.106) (0.105)
reputet−1 × (Q5t − Q1t) 0.218*** 0.129*** 0.872*** 0.722***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.151) (0.139)
Perf-Half(t+1) 0.199*** 0.195*** 0.767*** 0.715***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.066) (0.066)
Risk(t) -0.976*** -0.609** -1.984 -0.931
(0.250) (0.250) (1.245) (1.278)
Size(t) -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.007 -0.007
(0.002) (0.002) (0.012) (0.012)
Exp Ratio(t) -0.009 0.197 0.904 1.405
(0.691) (0.713) (3.302) (3.398)
Continued on next page
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Panel A: FLOWt+1 Panel B: ∆Mktt+1
Raw Alpha Raw Alpha
Age(t) -0.035*** -0.037*** -0.098*** -0.102***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.028) (0.029)
Cat Flow(t+1) 0.365*** 0.362*** -0.532* -0.543*
(0.052) (0.055) (0.301) (0.299)
Intercept -0.012 -0.035 -0.234 -0.283
(0.035) (0.035) (0.237) (0.229)
N 11780 11780 11780 11780
Adj. R2 0.221 0.198 0.081 0.070
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Table 2.7: Flows With Longer Horizon for Recent Performance
Table presents estimation result for 2.3 with a modification that Perfit is measured over
two-year window instead of one-year and past performance is measured over a four-year
window previous to the recent performance window. Q jit = 1 if recent performance at
time t denoted by Perft lies in the jth quintile. Panel A and B uses raw return measure and
CAPM-Alpha to sort the funds. Control variables include half yearly performance during
t + 1 (Perf-Halft+1), logarithm of the fund size, logarithm of fund age plus one, turnover,
expense ratio, risk, which is computed using monthly return data for the period t, and
category flow for time t + 1, which is the asset weighted growth of the investment category
to which a fund belongs. All the specifications have time fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered at the fund level to control for serial correlation within each panel. Standard
errors are in parenthesis and *, ** and *** denote significance of coefficient at 10%, 5%
and 1% level respectively. All the models have an intercept. Q1 is the base group and
hence effects of Q j are incremental over Q1. Similarly interactions effects for Q j × repute
are incremental over Q1 × repute.
Table 2.7: Flows With Longer Horizon for Recent Performance
Panel A: Returns Panel B: Alpha
Q2t − Q1t 0.008 0.005 0.029*** 0.001
(0.008) (0.015) (0.008) (0.014)
Q3t − Q1t 0.042*** 0.021 0.041*** 0.017
(0.009) (0.016) (0.008) (0.017)
Q4t − Q1t 0.074*** 0.024 0.097*** 0.035*
(0.009) (0.018) (0.010) (0.018)
Continued on next page
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Table 2.7 – Continued from previous page
Panel A: Return Panel B:Alpha
Q5t − Q1t 0.177*** 0.048* 0.173*** 0.034
(0.013) (0.028) (0.013) (0.028)
reputet−2 0.158*** 0.066*** 0.156*** 0.040*
(0.014) (0.022) (0.014) (0.022)
reputet−2 × (Q2t − Q1t) 0.022 0.079***
(0.029) (0.027)
reputet−2 × (Q3t − Q1t) 0.063** 0.076**
(0.030) (0.030)
reputet−2 × (Q4t − Q1t) 0.117*** 0.144***
(0.031) (0.031)
reputet−2 × (Q5t − Q1t) 0.230*** 0.257***
(0.043) (0.044)
Perf-Half(t+1) 0.283*** 0.283*** 0.277*** 0.277***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Risk(t) -0.579* -0.576* 0.104
(0.300) (0.298) (0.308) (0.306)
Size(t) -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.015***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Exp Ratio(t) -1.089 -1.136 -0.891 -0.927
(0.727) (0.723) (0.736) (0.735)
Age(t) -0.031*** -0.030*** -0.032*** -0.031***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Continued on next page
65
Table 2.7 – Continued from previous page
Panel A: Return Panel B:Alpha
Cat Flow(t+1) 0.105*** 0.105*** 0.104*** 0.104***
(0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025)
Intercept -0.035 -0.005 -0.074** -0.037
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037)
N 9384 9384 9384 9384
Adj. R2 0.343 0.347 0.339 0.344
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Table 2.8: Reputation and Managerial Replacements
Table presents estimation of the following regression equation
FLOWit+1 = a + φPer fit + ψ (Per fit × reputeit−1) + γreputeit−1 + CONTROLit + εit+1
Perft and reputeit−1 denote the normalized ranks for recent performance and reputation
index (computed using five-year window ending at year t − 1) respectively . First two
columns use raw returns and next two use CAPM-Alpha to rank the funds within each
investment style. First and third columns report regression for the subsample where there
was a managerial replacement during time t − 1. Second and fourth columns report re-
gression for the subsample where there was no managerial replacement during t − 1. Con-
trol variables include half yearly performance during t + 1 (Perf-halft+1) ,log fund size,
log(age+1), turnover, expense ratio, risk, which is computed using monthly data of recent
period and category flow which is the asset weighted growth of fund’s investment cate-
gory during t + 1. All specifications have time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered
at the fund level to control for serial correlation within each panel. Standard errors are in
parenthesis and *, ** and *** denote significance of coefficient at 10%, 5% and 1% level
respectively.
Table 2.8: Reputation and Managerial Replacements
Panel A: Returns Panel B: Alpha
Replace Yes No Yes No
Continued on next page
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Table 2.8 – Continued from previous page
Panel A: Returns Panel B: Alpha
Replace Yes No Yes No
Perft 0.135** 0.123*** 0.169*** 0.146***
-0.052 -0.029 -0.061 -0.033
reputet−1 0.007 0.034 -0.013 -0.036
-0.046 -0.024 -0.047 -0.023
Perft× reputet−1 0.196* 0.313*** 0.104 0.280***
-0.102 -0.05 -0.099 -0.052
Perf-Half(t+1) 0.191*** 0.194*** 0.198*** 0.197***
-0.033 -0.014 -0.035 -0.014
Risk(t) -0.172 -0.261** -0.232* -0.029
-0.149 -0.107 -0.136 -0.11
Size(t) -0.012* -0.014*** -0.011 -0.013***
-0.007 -0.003 -0.007 -0.003
Expense Ratio(t) -1.09 -0.542 -0.895 -0.348
-1.7 -0.836 -1.638 -0.837
Age(t) 0 -0.028*** -0.003 -0.030***
-0.015 -0.007 -0.016 -0.007
Category Flow(t+1) 0.181*** 0.069*** 0.181*** 0.072***
-0.058 -0.022 -0.057 -0.023
Intercept -0.123 0.008 -0.084 -0.009
-0.087 -0.043 -0.088 -0.045
Continued on next page
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Table 2.8 – Continued from previous page
Panel A: Returns Panel B: Alpha
Replace Yes No Yes No
N 1136 7014 1136 7014
Adj R2 0.158 0.21 0.152 0.208
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Table 2.9: Impact of Reputation With Various Fee Structures
Table presents estimation of the following regression equation
FLOWit+1 = a + φPer fit + ψ (Per fit × reputeit−1) + γreputeit−1 + CONTROLit + εit+1
Perft and reputeit−1 denote normalized ranks for recent performance and past performance
index (computed using five-year window ending at year t − 1) respectively . First two
columns use raw returns and next two use CAPM-Alpha to rank the funds within each
investment style. The first and third columns report regression for the subsample of funds
with low front loads (bottom quintile of front loads) and the second and fourth columns
report regression for the subsample of funds with high front loads (top quintile of front
loads). Control variables include half yearly performance during t + 1 (Perf-halft+1) ,log
fund size, log(age+1), turnover, expense ratio, risk which is computed using monthly data
of recent period and category flow which is the asset weighted growth of fund’s investment
category during t + 1. All specifications have time fixed effects. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the fund level to control for serial correlation within each panel. Standard errors
are in parenthesis and *, ** and *** denote significance of coefficient at 10%, 5% and 1%
level respectively.
Table 2.9: Impact of Reputation With Various Fee Structures
Panel A: Raw Returns Panel B: CAPM-Alpha
Front Load Low High Low High
Continued on next page
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Table 2.9 – Continued from previous page
Panel A: Raw Returns Panel B: CAPM Alpha
Front Load Low High Low High
Perft 0.171*** 0.153*** 0.167*** 0.166***
(0.042) (0.039) (0.049) (0.039)
reputet−1 0.054 0.096*** 0.058 0.098***
(0.036) (0.035) (0.037) (0.032)
Perft× reputet−1 0.268*** 0.140** 0.222*** 0.102
(0.071) (0.066) (0.081) (0.067)
Perf-Half(t+1) 0.221*** 0.123*** 0.220*** 0.131***
(0.021) (0.020) (0.022) (0.021)
Risk(t) -1.053* -1.473*** -0.814 -0.984**
(0.557) (0.453) (0.495) (0.450)
Size(t) -0.028*** -0.016*** -0.026*** -0.016***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Expense Ratio(t) -6.730*** 3.680* -6.927*** 3.764*
(1.804) (1.937) (1.821) (1.937)
Age(t) -0.018 -0.016 -0.022 -0.013
(0.015) (0.010) (0.014) (0.010)
Category Flow(t+1) 0.437*** 0.119*** 0.484*** 0.117***
(0.096) (0.043) (0.100) (0.042)
Intercept 0.106 -0.057 0.108 -0.092
(0.085) (0.066) (0.085) (0.066)
Continued on next page
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Table 2.9 – Continued from previous page
Panel A: Raw Returns Panel B: CAPM Alpha
Front Load Low High Low High
N 2581 2785 2581 2785
Adj R2 0.239 0.169 0.223 0.164
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Table 2.10: Hypothesis Testing For Main Results
This table presents the hypothesis tests for the main results in table 2.2 and 2.3. Two
hypothesis are tested. For j = 2, 3, 4, 5
H0 : Q j = Q j−1
and second hypothesis is about monotonically increasing interactions
H0 : repute × Q j = repute × Q j−1
Both the hypothesis are tested with two-sided alternative. F-values are reported for each
test and p-value is reported in bracket below F-value.
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Table 2.10: Hypothesis Testing: Return Chasing and Interaction Effects
Panel A Panel B
Model Without Model With
Interaction Effects Interaction Effects
CAPM Raw Returns CAPM Raw Returns
Return Chasing Effect
Q2t − Q1t 42.24 33.19 1.33 2.01
(0) (0) (0.24) (0.156)
Q3t − Q2t 56.09 70.66 3.35 2.1
(0) (0) (0.06) (0.147)
Q4t − Q3t 34.42 30.79 2.13 1.44
(0) (0) (0.14) (0.23)
Q5t − Q4t 87.79 138.26 5.45 8.83
(0) (0) (0.019) (0.003)
Interaction Effect
reputet−1 × (Q2t − Q1t) 8.69 4.23
(0.003) (0.039)
reputet−1 × (Q3t − Q2t) 4.01 11.64
(0.045) (0)
reputet−1 × (Q4t − Q3t) 2.16 2.61
(0.141) (0.106)
reputet−1 × (Q5t − Q4t) 4.93 10.17
(0.026) (0.001)
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Table 2.11 Reputation and Performance Persistence
At the end of each year, funds are sorted based on their historic four-factor alpha computed using
five-year window. Ten equally weighted portfolios are formed to represent each decile of the past
performance . For each portfolio, monthly returns are computed for each month in the following
year with weights rescaled to account for any fund disappearance. This process is repeated for
each year which generates a series of 420 monthly return observations for each decile portfolio.
Table presents regression estimates of the four-factor model ran separately for each decile portfolio.
Market, SMB, HML and Momentum, represents factor betas for each portfolio and Alpha is the
four-factor Alpha. CRSP value-weighted index is used as a proxy for market returns. Rest of the
factor data comes from Ken French’s website. t-stats are in parenthesis.
Table 2.11: Reputation and Performance Persistence
Reputation Market SMB HML Momentum 4-factor Adj
Decile Beta Beta Beta Beta Alpha R2
D1 1.00426*** 0.16568*** -0.02126 0.00836 -0.00137*** 0.968
(0.01232) (0.01845) (0.02147) (0.01435) (0.00045)
D2 1.00323*** 0.17559*** -0.00004 0.02108 -0.00138*** 0.976
(0.00988) (0.01873) (0.01886) (0.01535) (0.00039)
D3 1.01012*** 0.14140*** 0.02330 0.01872 -0.00118*** 0.976
(0.01136) (0.01883) (0.02081) (0.01400) (0.00040)
D4 0.98307*** 0.13459*** 0.03731** 0.00185 -0.00060* 0.978
(0.01017) (0.01757) (0.01775) (0.01180) (0.00035)
D5 0.97228*** 0.13435*** 0.02788 0.00757 -0.00059 0.975
(0.01108) (0.02109) (0.01739) (0.01116) (0.00037)
D6 0.96283*** 0.08781*** 0.00442 -0.00417 -0.00039 0.972
(0.01688) (0.02009) (0.01763) (0.01291) (0.00045)
D7 0.96463*** 0.13536*** 0.01433 0.00991 -0.00022 0.974
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(0.01140) (0.01836) (0.02146) (0.01302) (0.00040)
D8 0.97028*** 0.16909*** -0.01974 0.01421 -0.00048 0.977
(0.01387) (0.01493) (0.01666) (0.01190) (0.00041)
D9 0.94807*** 0.17254*** -0.02423 -0.00728 0.00023 0.972
(0.01533) (0.01826) (0.02095) (0.01340) (0.00044)
D10 0.98846*** 0.20101*** -0.00393 -0.01694 -0.00018 0.969
(0.01092) (0.02160) (0.01902) (0.01344) (0.00044)
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Figure 2.1: Reputation and Fund Flow Schedule
The figure plots fund flow-schedule for funds with the top and the bottom quantile of past
performance, keeping all the other explanatory variables at their respective mean levels.
Fund flows are expressed in percentage terms. X-axis denotes the recent performance
quantile. The shaded area is the 95% confidence interval around the point estimate which
is depicted by the line connected by dots
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Figure 2.2: Model Implied Fund Flows
This figure plots the model implies fund flow schedules. Graph is produced with
following parameters: λhigh = 0.96, λlow = 0, f = 1.5%, ψlow = .50, ψhigh = 0
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Chapter 3
Historical Performance and Risk-Shifting In
Mutual Fund Industry
3.1 Introduction
I study the risk-taking or the risk-shifting behavior of the mutual fund managers in response to
the multi-dimensional managerial incentives. On one hand, investors determine their mutual fund
holdings given the fund’s recent performance which, in turn, shapes the manager’s compensation
as often managers are compensated in the proportion of growth in the fund’s assets. I term this
as compensation incentive. On the other hand, manager’s employment incentives arise from the
fact that the fund company determines whether to continue the employment contract with the same
manager or to terminate him given his performance. I empirically show that both these incentives
are a function of the fund’s historical performance and not just affected by the recent performance.
Given this, I conjecture that the risk-taking behavior of the managers depends on their historical
performance. For brevity, managers with a good (poor) historical performance are called good-
history (poor-history) managers.
(Brown et al., 1996), using the data from 1985 to 1991, documents that a midyear losing manager
increase the portfolio risk more than a midyear winning manager during the second half of the year,
to catch up with the peers. (Kempf et al., 2009) document that risk-shifting behavior depends on
whether the compensation incentives or the employment incentives dominate during a given year. I
uncover a new channel namely the historical performance of the manager that has the explanatory
power for the risk-taking behavior. Once I consider the past performance, I document a dramatic
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heterogeneity in the way managers respond to their midyear rank. None of the earlier papers have
documented this heterogeneity in the risk-taking behavior.
(Javadekar, 2016) documents that the fund-flow level and the sensitivity both increases in the fund’s
historical performance. This fact implies that the good-history managers have an incentive to take
the risk to capture the higher level of flows that accrue to them after a good performance. On the
other hand, the poor-history managers face relatively insensitive fund-flows and to that extent, they
are not motivated by the fund-flow incentives. Turning to the employment incentives, (Chevalier
and Ellison, 1999) and (Khorana, 1996b) both documents an inverse relationship between recent
performance and the firing probability. Contrary to that, I document the dependence of managerial
firing on the historical performance. First, I show that for any level of recent performance, the firing
probability is decreasing in the historical performance. Second, I show that the traction of the recent
performance on the firing probability becomes weaker with the historical performance. These two
observations imply that the poor-history managers face a more severe unemployment risk, but
at the same time they can increase the chances of employment continuation with a better recent
performance. On the other hand, the good-history managers neither face significant unemployment
risk nor can they alter the likelihood of firing by improving their yearly performance. In this sense,
a good-history manager is not motivated by the employment incentives. In summary, we have
that a good-history manager is primarily affected by the compensation incentive and a poor-history
manager by the employment incentives.
Given that historical performance shapes the manager’s incentives, his portfolio choice is highly
likely to be influenced by his historical record. In the data, I exactly find this to be the case. First, a
poor-history manager acts more risk-averse as compared to the good-history manager during both
the bull and the bear periods. A good-history manager always engages in the risk-shifting. That
is amongst the class of the good-history managers, the ratio of the portfolio risk of the second
half to the first half of the year is more for a midyear loser than a midyear winner. The extent of
this tendency is more pronounced during bull years as fund flow level is much higher during the
bull periods. Note that the nature of the unemployment incentive is virtually unchanged across
bull and bear periods for the good-history managers. Hence, the change in risk-shifting intensity
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across bull and bear periods can be attributed to the compensation or fund flow incentives. Second,
a poor-history manager never engages in risk-shifting. During bull phases, he acts neutral in the
sense that a midyear performance has no traction on the risk-shifting ratio. During the bear phases,
given the extremely high unemployment risk, a poor-history manager infact enegages in the reverse
risk-shifting. That is amongst the class of the poo-history managers, the ratio of the portfolio risk
of the second half to the first half of the year is less for a midyear loser than a midyear winner.
These findings are important in that they showcase the fact that manager’s risk-taking behavior is
linked to the basic incentives they face. Simple linear risk-shifting technology describes managerial
behavior.
3.2 Literature Review
The focus of the risk-shifting literature has been on trying to understand how the managers change
the portfolio risk during the second half of the year in response to their midyear position. The pres-
ence of fund flow incentives and employment incentives rationalize risk-shifting motive. (Chevalier
and Ellison, 1997) and (Sirri and Tufano, 1998) both documents that the fund flow schedule is con-
vex. (Carpenter, 2000) and (Chen, 2009) show that the midyear losing managers have an incentive
to increase the risk during the second half of the year given these convex incentives. (Basak et al.,
2007) show that managers shift the tracking error of the portfolio over a finite range of midyear
performance, especially around the kink of the fund flow schedule. The empirical literature has
given a mixed evidence at the best. (Brown et al., 1996) document that a midyear losing manager
increases relative risk during the second half of the year. (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997) document
that young managers are likely to adjust the risk in response to mid-year peer adjusted position.
(Kempf et al., 2009) stresses the distinctive role of employment incentives and compensation in-
centives for managerial risk taking. They show that when employment (compensation) incentives
dominate, then midyear losing managers reduce (increase) the risk during the second half of the
year more than the midyear winning managers. (Hu et al., 2011) provides a model with U-shaped
risk choice in midyear performance and find similar support in the data.
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Motivated by the impact of the past performance on both types of managerial incentives, I propose
conditioning of the risk-shifting results on the fund’s historical performance.
3.3 Data and Variables
3.3.1 Data
I use CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free Mutual Fund Database, covering a period from 1999 to 2014 at an
annual frequency. Sample selection is in line with the earlier literature. I focus on the US domestic
open-ended equity funds. I exclude sector, index, and specialty funds. Because names or styles may
not reflect the actual nature of the fund, I also exclude funds whose mean equity holdings are less
than 70%. I rule out any funds where size is smaller than 15 million USD and also any fund whose
age is three years or less. Many funds offer multiple share classes to represent various categories
of investors or types of distribution used to market the fund. Following the earlier literature, I
aggregate all the share classes belonging to one fund. The size of the fund is the sum of sizes of
all the share classes, and fund age is the age of the oldest share class. Other variables like turnover,
expense ratio, returns, etc. are computed on size-weighted average basis.
I use daily fund returns data which is available starting from 1999. For each fund, I compute daily
excess return over the mean daily return of the investment category to which that fund belongs.
Then σ(rit,k − bt,k) is just the standard deviation of these excess return computed for k = 1, 2.
3.3.2 Splitting The Sample
Following (Kempf et al., 2009), I split the sample according to whether the midyear stock market
return is positive or negative. For this purpose, I use CRSP’s value-weighted stock market index. I
label the years with negative (positive) midyear stock market return as bear (bull) years. The basic
conjecture is that the compensation (employment) incentives dominate during bull (bear) years.
Market returns proxies the state of the industry to a good extent. Aggregate capital flows are low
following a bear market (Karceski, 2002). That is during the bear markets, a manager can attract
not a great deal of new capital flow even with a good performance. Manager’s compensation
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depends on the size of the fund which does not grow drastically during the bear markets. Also,
bonus payments are linked to the profitability of the fund family (Farnsworth and Taylor, 2006)
which is low during the bear markets. In this sense, the compensation incentives are weaker during
bear years. On the contrary, firing probability is higher during bear markets (Chevalier and Ellison,
1999). Therefore, employment incentives are stronger during bear markets. It is easy to see that
the compensation incentives are more important during bull markets by reversing the arguments
above.
3.3.3 Risk-Shifting Measure
It is important to fix on the notion of the risk before computing risk-shifting. For example, if an
active fund benchmarks his portfolio completely, then his portfolio volatility is equal to the market
volatility. If market volatility goes up during the second half of the year, then manager’s portfolio
volatility goes up as well. If the measure of risk is raw volatility of portfolio return, then the risk
seems to have been shifted. But from a strategic perspective, portfolio benchmarking is unchanged.
Which measure of risk is more appropriate? Because managers adjust the risk to outperform,
the answer to the question depends on what notion of outperformance they are targeting. Fund
companies evaluate managers in comparison to the pre-defined benchmark. On the other hand,
the empirical evidence shows that investor assesses the manager based upon risk-adjusted or peer
adjusted performance (Berk and Van Binsbergen, 2014). Given this, the appropriate notion of the
risk-shifting is the extent to which the portfolio is similar to the portfolio of peers or appropriate
benchmark. One quick way to measure how similar the portfolio was is to compute the volatility
the fund returns are around mean returns of the peers.
Using this background and following (Kempf et al., 2009) and (Brown et al., 1996), I construct the
first measure of risk-shifting as follows
RS Rit =
σ(rit,2 − bt,2)
σ(rit,1 − bt,1) (3.1)
where rit,k − bt,k indicates the excess fund return over the benchmark during kth half of the year.
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For my measure, bt,k is the mean return over all the funds belonging to similar investment objective
during kth half of the year t.
3.4 Dependence of Incentives on Historical Performance
3.4.1 Unemployment Incentives
Table 3.1 presents the evidence about firing probabilities as a function of the recent performance
and historical performance. I perform the analysis for the bear and the bull periods separately.
Panel A shows the firing incidences for the bear years, and Panel B shows it for thebull years. First,
a poor-history manager faces a severe risk of getting replaced after a recent poor performance. The
probabilities are 8.37% and 14.48% during bull and bear years respectively. These are economi-
cally large probabilities in absolute terms as well as relative to the corresponding firing probabilities
for a good-history manager which are almost a third in magnitude for a similar recent performance.
Second, the table shows that firing probabilities drop significantly with recent performance for a
poor-history manager. For example, if a poor-history manager ranks within top third during the
current period then the probability is reduced to mere 2.53%, down from 14.48% during the bear
years. But same is not true for a good-history manager. Firing probabilities hardly vary across
the range of the current performance. These two observations show that poor-history managers are
affected by the employment risk and recent performance can help them reduce the risk. On the
other hand, a good-history manager is not very much concerned about the unemployment risk for
two reasons: one is that the probability of firing is low in absolute terms, and he can’t reduce it
with a better recent performance. 1
3.4.2 Compensation Incentives
Fund-flows drive compensation incentives to a large extent for the mutual fund managers. Evi-
dence on Return chasing on the part of the mutual fund investors is well documented by (Ippolito,
1Some of the good-history managers might leave the fund voluntarily for a bigger contract after one
more good performance. This might account for higher replacement probabilities at the top end of recent
performance for a good-history manager.
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1992), (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997), and (Sirri and Tufano, 1998), among others. But (Javadekar,
2016) finds that the pattern of fund flows is determined primarily by the interaction between recent
and historical fund performance. Table 3.5 reproduces the main findings of that paper. The first
model in Panel A regresses flows on the current performance without considering the historical
performance. The positive coefficient on the recent performance variable indicates return chasing.
In the second column of Panel A, I include the interaction between the recent and the historical
performance. First, the impact of the return chasing is drastically weaker. Coefficient reduces from
0.35 to 0.16, a drop of more than 50%. Second, the coefficient on the interaction term equals 0.29.
It is statistically and economically large. In fact, it is bigger than the coefficient of the recent per-
formance. The evidence shows how the historical performance determines the sensitivity of fund
flows. In particular, the fund flows are sensitive for the managers with high historical rank. In
panel B, I repeat the regressions with a split sample. The results are valid across bull and bear
years. Therefore, the results indicate that a poor-history manager has relatively weaker incentive to
improve the performance to attract new capital. This finding is valid across various market states.
3.5 Hypothesis Development
The basic logic behind the following hypothesis is that the good-history managers are driven by the
compensation incentives while the poor-history managers are driven primarily by the employment
incentives.
Hypothesis 7 The extent to which a midyear loser increases the risk relative a midyear winner
fund is more for the category of the good-history managers than for the category of the poor-history
managers. Formally, for r1 > r2
RS Rgood,t(r2) − RS Rgood,t(r1) > RS Rpoor,t(r2) − RS Rpoor,t(r1)
where r1 and r2 indicate the level of midyear performance.
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This hypothesis conjectures that a good-history manager has more appetite to shift the risk up
during the year in response to his weak midyear performance as compared to a poor-history man-
ager. There are two channels at work here. First, during any market state, a good-history manager
is relatively less concerned about the unemployment risk. At the same time, for a good-history
manager, the level, the sensitivity and the convexity of flow-schedule is higher relative to a poor-
history manager. Both these channels lead to the unambiguous conclusion that for a given weak
midyear performance, a good-history manager would deviate more from the benchmark portfolio
as compared to a poor-history manager.
Hypothesis 8 For any type of manager, the extent of risk-shifting given a midyear losing position
is lower during the bear years than the bull years. Formally, for r1 > r2
[RS Ri,t(r2) − RS Ri,t(r1)]bull > [RS Ri,t(r2) − RS Ri,t(r1)bear
where r1 and r2 indicate the level of midyear performance.
This follows because unemployment risk increases during the bear markets. Even for a good-
history manager, it increases relative to the bull years.
Hypothesis 9 The difference in risk-shifting ratio between good-history and poor-history manager
widens during bear years as compared to the bull years. Formally, for any r1,
[RS Rgood,bear(r1)] − RS Rpoor,bear(r1)] > [RS Rgood,bull(r1)] − RS Rpoor,bull(r1)]
The rise in the unemployment risk is more dramatic for the poor-history managers during the bear
years. The flow-schedule is invariant in terms of how flows react to the recent performance across
the bear and the bull phases. This suggests that the poor-history managers would become relatively
more risk-averse during the bear phases as compared to the bull phases, widening the difference in
the risk-shifting ratio between the good-history and the poor-history managers.
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3.6 Results
3.6.1 Contingency Tables
I present the primary results using traditional 2 × 2 contingency tables using the midyear perfor-
mance and the risk-shifting ratio as two dimensions. Each fund with below (above) median midyear
performance is classified as midyear loser (midyear winner). Similarly, a fund with below (above)
median risk-shifting ratio is classified as having low (high) RSR. The median for both the variables
is computed over all the funds following a particular investment category. I additionally sort the
funds using its historical performance. To this end, I consider last year’s performance as a historical
record. A fund is called good-history (bad-history) if its performance ranked amongst top (bottom)
20% of the funds within their investment segment during last year.
The evidence is presented in the table 3.2 for bull years and 3.3 for the bear years. First, comparing
panel A, B and C across tables 3.2 and 3.3, we see that a midyear loser is more likely to have a
low RSR if belonging to the class of poor-history managers. During the bull years, 53.60% of the
midyear losers have below median RSR within the class of poor-history managers as compared to
47.93% for the class of good-history managers. The numbers are 57.17% and 50.87% respectively
for the bear years. Next, comparing the bear and bull numbers for the same class of managers,
we see that a more fraction of midyear losing managers has lower RSR during bear years. The
numbers are 53.60% and 57.17% for bull and bear years for the poor-history managers and 47.93%
and 50.87% for the good-history managers. Third, comparing the absolute fractions, we see that
the poor-history midyear losers are always more likely to act risk-averse. Within the class of the
poor-history managers, during both the bear and the bull years, more than half of the midyear losers
have lower RSR. On the other hand, good-history managers act as risk-takers during bull years.
Note that when we do not condition on the historical performance, both the extent and the direction
of the risk-shifting behavior becomes obscure to understand. Evidence in panel C of both the tables
suggests that during the bull years, midyear losers are more likely to have high risk-shifting ratio
(51.70% as against 48.20%), but during bear years the reverse is true. During bear years, midyear
losers are less likely to have higher risk-shifting ratio (48.06% as against 51.89%). This evidence
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is consistent with (Kempf et al., 2009) who were the first to point out that the risk-shifting behavior
is different during the bear and the bull years. The contribution of this paper is to show that there
is one more level of heterogeneity that is masked behind these numbers.
3.6.2 Regression
I test the hypothesis using regression approach in this section. In particular, I estimate the following
regression model for the bear and the bull years separately.
RS Rit = β0 + β1 × (rit,1 − bt,1) + β2 × Rank(rit−1 − bt−1)
+β3[(rit,1 − bt,1) × Rank(rit−1 − bt−1)] + Controlsit + εit
where rit,k − bt,k denotes the benchmark-adjusted fund performance during the kth half of the year
and rit − bt denotes the benchmark-adjusted fund performance for the full year t. Rank(x) denotes
the normalized rank of the fund when sorted by variable x that lie between 0 and 1. The estimates
are presented in table 3.4. The panel A estimates the equation without considering the historical
performance while the Panel B include historical performance and its interaction with the midyear
performance. Column head indicates the state of the market (bull or bear).
First, consider panel A. The results are consistent with (Kempf et al., 2009). The coefficient on the
midyear performance is negative for the bull years, and it is positive for the bear years. A negative
coefficient suggests that the risk-shifting ratio (RS Rit) is decreasing in the midyear performance; a
midyear loser increases the risk more than a midyear winner. (Kempf et al., 2009) argues that com-
pensation incentives dominate during the bull years which leads to risk-shifting by midyear losers
to catch up with the peers and get additional capital. But during the bear years, unemployment risk
shoots up. Therefore, a midyear loser is more averse to shift the risk up as compared to a midyear
winner, leading to a positive coefficient on midyear performance. These are the findings without
considering the historical performance.
In the panel B, I include the historical performance along with the midyear performance. Hypoth-
esis 7 implies that β3 is negative. Hypothesis 8 implies twin conditions: β1(bear) > β1(bull)
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for the poor-history managers and [β1 + β3](bear) > [β1 + β)3](bull). Hypothesis 9 implies that
[β1 − β3](bear) > [β1 − β3](bull). From the table we see that, all the conjectures or hypothesis
are confirmed. A poor-history manager has a lower RSR during any given market state. Any given
manager is more risk-averse in the bear phase and that the heterogeneity in risk-shifting widens dur-
ing the bear phase across the good-history and the poor-history managers. Analyzing the absolute
values of coefficients we see that, the coefficient on Per fit,1 is always non-negative indicating that
only the midyear performance does not induce risk-shifting on the part of the midyear losers. It’s
only for the good-history managers that a weak midyear performance causes positive risk-shifting.
The fact that [β1 + β3] is negative for both the phases confirms the fact.
3.7 Conclusion
The paper analyzes the risk-shifting behavior of the mutual fund managers and finds that the histor-
ical performance matters in the determination of the risk-shifting patterns. This dependence comes
from the fact that the managerial incentives are dependent on the historical performance. Paper
documents the dependence of unemployment incentives on the past performance. Next, the paper
shows that the conjectured behavior is valid in the data. In particular, the poor-history managers
are more averse to increase the risk in response to midyear performance. Moreover, managers,
in general, are more reluctant to shift the risk up during the bear phases. Additionally, I find the
cross-sectional variation in risk-shifting is higher during the bear phases. The difference mostly
comes from the fact that the poor-history managers turn dramatically risk-averse mainly due to
the corresponding disproportionate increase in the unemployment risk for these managers during
the bear phase. In terms of the contribution, this paper shows that risk-shifting behavior can be
explained without non-linear models once we condition on the historical performance of the fund.
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Table 3.1: Performance and Probability of Firing
(rit−1 − bt−1)→ Poor History (t-1) Good History (t-1)
(rit − bt)→ Poor Med Top Poor Med Top
Bear Years
Not Fired
N 124 446 231 334 1,054 381
% 85.517 91.206 97.468 94.084 95.126 95.012
Fired
N 21 43 6 21 54 20
% 14.482 8.793 2.531 5.915 4.873 4.987
Bull Years
Not Fired
N 328 1,056 391 568 1,647 639
% 91.620 94.369 96.543 96.928 96.259 97.856
Fired
N 30 63 14 18 64 14
% 8.379 5.630 3.456 3.071 3.740 2.143
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Table 3.4: Midyear Risk-Shifting By Fund Managers
The table presents the evidence on managerial risk-shifting. The dependent variable is
midyear risk-shifting. Panel A regresses risk-shifting measure on midyear performance
without the interactions with historical performance. Panel B considers the interaction
between midyear performance and the historical performance. Perfi,1t denotes the
peer-adjusted performance of the fund in the first half of the year t and reputeit−1 indicates
the historical performance of that fund at the start of the year t. Bull (Bear) denotes the
years when midyear stock market return is positive (negative). All the regressions have
time and fund investment category fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at share
class level.
Panel A Panel B
Bull Bear Bull Bear
Perfi1,t -0.351*** 0.253*** -0.118 0.776***
(0.082) (0.079) (0.131) (0.146)
reputei,t−1 -0.021** 0.013
(0.011) (0.014)
Perfi1,t× reputei,t−1 -0.512** -1.052***
(0.228) (0.251)
Log Size (t-1) -0.003 0.008*** -0.002 0.007***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Expense Ratio (t-1) -0.717 1.205 -0.765 1.164
(0.527) (0.885) (0.526) (0.879)
Log Age (t-1) 0.003 -0.014* 0.003 -0.013*
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008)
Intercept 1.027*** 0.947*** 1.038*** 0.944***
(0.020) (0.031) (0.021) (0.032)
N 6465 3704 6465 3704
Adj. R-sq 0.595 0.603 0.595 0.605
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Table 3.5: Historical Performance and Fund Flows
The table presents the regression of fund flows at time t + 1 on the performance at time t
given by Rank(rit − bt) and the performance at the time t − 1 given by Rank(rit−1 − bt−1).
Ranks are normalized to lie between 0 and 1. Control variables include age, size, and
expense ratio. All the models have time and style fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered at the fund level.
Panel A: Full Sample Panel B: State-Dependent
Bull Years Bear Years
Rank(rit − bt) 0.357*** 0.164*** 0.150*** 0.189***
(0.015) (0.027) (0.031) (0.042)
Rank(rit−1 − bt−1) 0.061*** 0.071*** 0.046
(0.021) (0.027) (0.031)
Rank(rit − bt)× 0.291*** 0.273*** 0.315***
Rank(rit−1 − bt−1) (0.047) (0.058) (0.075)
Log Size (t) -0.018*** -0.027*** -0.026*** -0.027***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Expense Ratio (t) -0.496 -0.678 -0.406 -0.985
(0.806) (0.808) (0.881) (1.268)
Log Age (t) -0.045*** -0.014** -0.015* -0.011
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
Intercept 0.067* 0.042 0.061 0.002
(0.035) (0.035) (0.039) (0.052)
N 10169 8747 5327 3420
adj. R-sq 0.125 0.143 0.127 0.162
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Chapter 4
Mutual Fund Flows When Manager Has Timing
and Picking Skills
4.1 Introduction
Typically a mutual fund manager is assessed based on his ability to produce alpha (α). α captures
per Dollar value generated by a manager after adjusting for market exposure of the portfolio.1 α
measures manager’s picking skill. But a manager can generate the value by adjusting the factor
exposure of the portfolio ahead of time by forecasting factors accurately. For example, lowering
portfolio beta (β) before the market downturn would produce a positive excess return which is
a value created by the manager. Such skill to forecast the market movement is the timing skill.
Much of the theoretical and empirical models analyzing mutual fund flows have focused on picking
skill only. For example, the benchmark model (Berk and Green, 2004) solves for equilibrium
capital flows when the manager has only picking skill. Because picking ability generates the value
independent of the market movements, the implications for fund flows are independent of the state
of the market. But level, as well as the sensitivity of capital flows to performance, appears to be
state-dependent in the data. I introduce timing skill to the (Berk and Green, 2004) framework which
generates state-dependent implications for capital flows.
Recent paper by (Franzoni and Schmalz, 2016) considers an environment where manager’s factor
exposure is unknown. In their paper, though the factor exposure is unknown, it is a constant, and it
1Typically Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) or Carhart’s four-factor model is used for computing
manager’s alpha.
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does not represent the skill. In other words, investor care only about α of the manager. Unknown
β only adds a layer of complexity to learning but does not shed light on how investors decision
changes in the presence of the picking skill. In short, little is known about how the presence of
timing skill impact the learning and consequently the mutual fund flows. The primary objective of
this paper is to fill this gap on the theoretical and empirical front.
My model features a mutual fund manager endowed with dual skills: timing and picking skill. Both
the skill components are unobservable and unknown to the investors. Investors are risk neutral and
provide capital competitively. That is they have deep pockets. Risk neutrality implies that investors
invest with the manager if expected return net of all fees is non-negative and liquidate their holdings
otherwise. The mutual fund is subject to decreasing returns to scale indicating that per The dollar
cost of operating the fund are increasing in the size of the fund. Capital move in and out of the
fund to achieve zero expected net return condition which also pins down the scale of the fund. The
main thrust of the model lies in the learning mechanism which I describe next.
The underlying learning mechanism is as follows: Investors learn about managers timing (picking)
skill during the periods when the aggregate market is volatile (calm). A period of high market
volatility presents an opportunity for the manager to generate timing value by altering the portfolio
beta. Hence, the fund performance during a volatile period is more informative about manager’s
timing skill. On the contrary, if the factor or the market is calm with minimal volatility, then the
only way to generate value is using picking skill. Hence, non-volatile periods are more informative
about manager’s picking skills. 2 The set-up, therefore, implies a market state-dependent learning
mechanism. Because, both the skills produce the value during different market states, investors care
about learning each of the skill components. For example, timing skill is valuable if the market is
expected to be volatile, but not otherwise.
The model generates empirical predictions when combined with the other characteristics of the
data. First, the stylized fact about market volatility is that it is persistent. It implies that during
volatile times, not only investors learn more about manager’s timing skill but because timing skill
2If these skills are correlated for the manager then learning about one skill has a spillover effect for the
other skill too. I analyze two limiting cases where there is no correlation between timing and picking skill
for a given manager and the other extreme, where both these skills are perfectly correlated.
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is more important during volatile periods, this learning has a strong bearing on the expected returns
requiring greater capital adjustment as compared to non-volatile period. It results in increased sen-
sitivity of capital flow to the fund performance during volatile times. The second feature of the data
is that market volatility is counter-cyclical. It implies that capital flow sensitivity to performance
is greater during periods of low market returns. Third, because timing skill becomes more impor-
tant during volatile times, whenever conditional market volatility rises compared to the past, then
proportionately more capital flows accrues to the managers who have exhibited better timing skill.
The paper is first to my knowledge that explores the implications of timing skill for mutual fund
flows. Earlier studies have identified the impact of fund’s return volatility on fund flows. (Huang
et al., 2012) both empirically and theoretically find that past fund performance volatility dampens
the sensitivity of flows. But to my knowledge, there is no paper which studies how market volatility
affects the flow sensitivity. Including market returns or market volatility as a control in the regres-
sion of flows on the fund performance tells us whether market volatility shifts the flow schedule up
or down. It is a result regarding the level of flows. To generate the implication for sensitivity we
need to interact the market volatility with fund performance. Data supports the predictions of the
model.
This paper is also important from the perspective of managerial incentives across market states.
Aggregate fund flows are increasing in stock market returns (Warther, 1995). (Karceski, 2002)
shows how this feature together with return-chasing on the part of the investors leads fund man-
agers to prefer high beta stocks. Evidence in this paper suggests that even if aggregate flows are
greater during the times of high stock market returns, the sensitivity of flows to fund performance
is substantially lower during these times. On the other hand, even when aggregate flows are low
during low stock return periods, the fund can lose a lot of capital if it underperforms during such
period. Hence, my paper provides a drastically different view on the incentives faced by fund
managers across market states.
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4.2 Model
4.2.1 Set-Up
The model has a mutual fund managed by a manager who generates the gross return as follows
Rit = αi + ψi f 2t + εit (4.1)
where εit ∼ N(0, σ2ε) is an error that hinders learning about skill. There are two skill components.
αi is manager’s picking skill. It is independent of market return which is denoted by ft. On the other
hand, ψi denotes the timing skill, which captures the manager’s ability to forecast market move-
ment. The basic idea is that whenever the market or the factor moves (either up or down) generating
large f 2t , a good market timer can forecast the movement and adjust portfolio β accordingly.
3 For
simplicity, I assume that Et−1( ft) = E( ft) = 0.
The model introduces the timing skill in an easy way. In reality, timing skill might be captured by a
more complicated process. Additionally, note that certain derivatives strategies (for example strad-
dle) allow managers to time the market even with zero market movement. (The skill is in predicting
zero market movement). But for an equity oriented mutual fund manager, investment mandates are
usually tight restricting the use of complex derivative strategies. Given these mandates, the simple
way to include timing skill is justifiable.
Total value generated by a manager is αi +ψi f 2t . Note that if ψi = 0, then the manager can not earn
any return from factor volatility. For a manager with timing and picking skill values of αi and ψi
respectively, the expected value is given by
Et−1(Rt|αi, ψi) = αi +
(
ψi × Σtt−1
)
(4.2)
where Σtt−1 ≡ Et−1( f 2t ) denotes the conditional volatility of market return, given that market has
zero expected return. Note that timing skill becomes more useful when the conditional volatility of
3One more way to understand the gross return equation is to imagine that there exists an asset with
non-negative payoff pi = f 2t and the extent to which a manager can access this privileged asset depends upon
the forecasting skill given by ψi.
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a factor is high: expectation is rising in conditional volatility. Note that the conditional volatility
is counter-cyclical as well as persistent. These facts coupled with learning mechanism produce an
asymmetric capital flow sensitivity to recent fund performance across market states. Consider a
volatile period with significant adverse market shock. A fund’s performance during such a time
will reveal a lot about the timing skill. Because conditional volatility is persistent, timing skill also
drives the expected return more prominently. On the contrary, a low volatility period with large
positive market shock will no doubt reveal a lot about psi, but the timing component does not affect
expected returns significantly now due to lower conditional volatility. Investor earns net return of
rit which is given by
rit = Rit − 1
η
qit−1 (4.3)
where qit−1 denotes the fund size at the end of t − 1. η > 0 implies decreasing returns to scale.
Existence of decreasing returns to scale is documented by (Pasto et al., 2015). Their estimate of η
is 0.22 × 106.
4.2.2 Learning
There are two unknowns αi and ψi to learn from one observable Rit. Investors have priors about αi
and ψi as follows: At time t αiψi
 ∼ N

αitψit
 ,
σ
2
αt 0
0 σ2ψt

 (4.4)
The simplistic assumption is that σαψ0 = 0 for analytical tractability. (Kacperczyk et al., 2014)
document that timing and picking skills are correlated for a given manager. In the appendix, I solve
the model where these skills are perfectly correlated. Consider time t + 1 fund and market return
observations Rit+1 and ft+1. Using Bayesian updating,
αit+1 = αit + λα,t [Rit+1 − Et(Rit+1)] (4.5)
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where
λα,t =
[
covt(Rit+1, αi| ft+1)
vart(Rit+1| ft+1)
]
=
 σ2αt
σ2αt + σ
2
ψt f
4
t+1 + σ
2


and similarly
ψit+1 = ψit + λψ,t [Rit+1 − Et(Rit+1)] (4.6)
where
λψ,t =
[
covt(Rit+1, ψi| ft+1)
vart(Rit+1| ft+1)
]
=
 σ2ψt f 2t+1
σ2αt + σ
2
ψt f
4
t+1 + σ
2


I will discuss the properties of learning in the next section when I solve the model quantities with
calibration.
4.2.3 Equilibrium Size and Fund Flows
Investors are risk neutral and provide capital competitively. ft is observable. Risk neutrality and
elastic capital provisioning implies that, investors invest in a fund until expected net value (skill
component) is non-negative.
Et(rit+1) = 0 (4.7)
If Et(rit+1) > (<)0, then investors invest into (liquidate out of) the fund, which increases (decreases)
per dollar cost of management reducing (increasing) net return. Process continues until expected
net return hits zero level. This condition directly pins down the equilibrium fund size.
Lemma 8 Equilibrium fund size is given by
qit = η
(
αit + ψitΣ
t+1
t
)
(4.8)
Fund size is increasing in the estimate of the picking skill independent of the market state. But the
estimate of the timing skill matters only through conditional factor volatility. What matters is the
multiplicative term given by ψitΣt+1t . Low conditional volatility lowers the value investor attaches
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to the timing skill. Note that in equilibrium
Et (Rit+1) = αit + ψitΣt+1t =
qit
η
where second equality is derived by rearranging equation 4.8. Surprise element in learning there-
fore simplifies to
Rit+1 − Et (Rit+1) = rit+1 + qit
η
− qit
η
= rit+1
This formulation allows us to express Bayesian updating formulas in terms of observables. With
learning and equilibrium size expressed in terms of observables, it is easy to derive an expression
for fund flows.
Lemma 9 Under the assumption of competitive capital markets, equilibrium fund flows are given
by
qit − qit−1 = η
[(
λα,t + λψ,tΣ
t+1
t
)
rit + ψit−1∆Σt+1t
]
(4.9)
where λα,t and λψ,t are given in equation 4.5 and 4.6 and ∆Σt+1t = Σ
t+1
t − Σtt−1.
4.2.4 Discussion On Learning Mechanism
The sensitivity of fund flows to the performance rit is governed by the coefficient
(
λα,t + λψ,tΣ
t+1
t
)
given in equation 9. Because both λα,t and λψt depend upon f
2
t , the flow sensitivity is a function
of f 2t or | ft|. To understand the behavior of λα,t and λψ,t, we need three estimates: σε, σψ and
σα. σε denotes the variability of fund returns around the skill level. Median fund return volatility
captures this parameter. In the data median of annual fund return volatility is 0.1682 or 16.82%.
Next two parameters namely σα and σψ can be estimated using the cross-sectional dispersion of
α and ψ estimated from factor model with timing and picking skill. To this end, I run following
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factor model to align the estimates with the model:
riτ,t − r fτ,t = αi + β( fτ,t − r fτ,t) + ψi f 2τ,t + νiτ,t (4.10)
These numbers are 0.1141 and 2.3507 respectively. Note that the uncertainty around the estimate
of timing skill ψ is very large relative to picking skill. Next target is to estimate conditional volatil-
ity. Because I am interested in generating implications for sensitivity as a function of ft the market
return, I estimate conditional volatility as a function of ft. To this end, I estimate an exponen-
tial conditional volatility model and express conditional volatility as a function of current market
performance. The conjectured model is
Σt+1t = ae
b ft
I proxy the conditional volatility Σt+1t by the realized volatility at time t + 1. I denote it by Σt+1
Estimates are presented in table 4.1. In data, a = 0.159 and b = −4.31. Negative coefficient on ft
implies that a current low return predicts high conditional volatility next period. Given these esti-
mates, I plot the components of the coefficient on rit as a function of ft in the following figure 4.1.
First observation is that λα,t = ∆αit, which measures the learning about αi is decreasing in | ft|. This
is true for any parametric values. This implies that with increasing | ft|, greater share of a surprise
return rit is ascribed to timing skill instead of picking skill. This happens because the contribution
of αi to return Rit is independent of | ft|, but Rit becomes more variable with | ft|. This means that
a smaller fraction of total variability of the signal can be explained by picking skill. The flip side
of this result can be seen in right top figure for λψ,t. λψ,t is increasing in | ft| up to a point. This
is because the contribution of timing skill ψi to Rit is increasing in | ft|. But as | ft| rises beyond a
thresh-hold, the variance of Rit grows even faster slowing the learning even for timing skill. This
explains why ∆ψit = λψ,t is decreasing beyond a thresh-hold for | ft|. Note that these results about
the shape of the learning curves are independent of specific parametric values. Second observation
is relating to the scale of ∆ψit versus scale of ∆αit. Given that σψi is an order magnitude larger than
σαi , the changes in estimates for ψi are also an order magnitude larger than that for αi. Note that
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λψ,t and λα,t are symmetric around ft = 0. What generates the asymmetry in the learning across
market states is the fact that conditional market volatility is counter-cyclical. Timing skill matters
for expected returns via conditional market volatility. This implies that the coefficient on rit is far
greater as conditional volatility rises over the empirically relevant range for | ft|. Note that as ft
rises, coefficient rises at first due to increase in λψ,t. But as ft rises further, not only λψ,t starts to
decrease but conditional volatility falls as well, resulting in the overall coefficient falling beyond a
point, say f for positive ft. The coefficient would fall even on the negative side as ft falls below a
level f < 0. But because conditional volatility is increasing as ft falls, | f | > | f |.
4.3 Data, Variables and Empirical Framework
4.3.1 Data
I use CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free Mutual Fund Database, covering a period from 1999 to 2014 at
a quarterly frequency. Sample selection is in line with the earlier literature. I focus on the US
domestic open-ended equity funds. I exclude sector, index, and specialty funds. Because names
or styles may not reflect the actual nature of the fund, I also exclude funds whose mean equity
holdings are less than 70%. I rule out any funds where size is smaller than 15 million USD and
also any fund whose age is three years or less. Many funds offer multiple share classes to represent
various categories of investors or types of distribution used to market the fund. Following (Huang
et al., 2012), I treat each share class as a separate panel which allows conditioning the results on
fee schedules and investor type that each share class attracts.
4.3.2 Variables
The main variable of interest is fund flows. In line with more recent literature [(Berk and Green,
2004); (Huang et al., 2012)], I define fund flows as percentage growth in assets under management
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(AUM) due to capital flows.4 In particular,
FLOWit =
AUMit − [AUMit−1 × (1 + rit)]
AUMit−1 × (1 + rit) , (4.11)
where AUMit denotes assets under management at the end of time t and rit is the net return earned
by the fund at the end of time t. In regression, I exclude all the funds with top 1% fund flows. Win-
sorization could be an alternative, but it is possible that such drastic high flows could be a result of
some major unobservable factor such as an anticipated change in management or some institutional
or high net worth client picking up a substantial stake in a smaller mutual fund. For these funds, the
average link between flows and performance is not valid, and instead of winsorization, it is better
to exclude them. As a robustness check, I also rerun the regressions with Dollar flows instead of
percentage flows as a measure.
I measure the performance of the fund using raw returns of the fund and then ranking the funds
according to raw returns across all the funds that follow similar investment mandate. This is similar
to (Sirri and Tufano, 1998) or (Spiegel and Zhang, 2013). The rank is normalized to fall between 0
(lowest) and 1 (highest). I denote performance rank by Perfit. Using a CAPM-Alpha or Four-Factor
Alpha model is not appropriate in this context as we want to understand the investor’s reaction to
the picking as well as timing skill.
The third important variable is conditional volatility. Fortunately, empirical setting simplifies the
computation of this variable. Though in a model, capital adjustment takes place at the end of time
t, in the data we link time t performance to time t + 1 flows. Then instead of using conditional
volatility estimate at the end of t, we can use realized market volatility at time t + 1 as this is
observable while investor decides to rebalanced the portfolio at time t + 1 in response to time t
performance. I denote the realized market volatility at time t by Σt.
I compute recent period risk using the recent quarter’s daily return data. Other variables used are
the log of fund age, fund size, expense ratio, and turnover ratio. Following (Sirri and Tufano, 1998),
I add one-seventh of the front-load and end-load to each year’s management fees to compute the
4Previous literature used AUMit−1 as a base in the formula for flows. If a fund loses all the assets, then
this traditional definition would measure a FLOWit different than -100%, which is clearly incorrect.
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expense ratio. I also control for overall flows accruing to each investment style to which the fund
belongs.
4.3.3 Can Investor Estimate Timing And Picking Skills?
Before I test the predictions of the model, it is instructive to test if investors are sophisticated
enough to react to a complicated factor model with timing skill component. To this end I study
how the fund flows react to various components of total fund return. First, I estimate a following
factor model to break-up the total fund returns in to various components:
riτ,t − r fτ,t = αi + β( fτ,t − r fτ,t) + ψi| fτ,t| + νiτ,t (4.12)
where αi, ψi and β represents picking component of the skill, timing component of the skill and
passive exposure to the market respectively and τ represents the day-index for quarter t. This factor
model is estimated for each quarter separately using daily data on the fund and the market return.
The estimated values of αi and ψi for quarter t are denoted by α̂it and ψ̂it. Next, I run a simple
flow-sensitivity regression at quarterly frequency as follows
FLOWit+1 = ρ0 + ρ1α̂it + ρ2
(
ψ̂it × | ft|
)
+ ρ3
(̂
βit × ft
)
+ Controlsit + it+1
The results are presented in table 4.2. Results strongly support the case for investor sophistication.
Coefficients on timing and picking component are positive while coefficient on the value generated
through passive exposure to the market (β × ft) is statistically not significant. This suggests two
things: First, investors do not chase passive value. In other words, investors are able to filter out the
passive component of the return not related to the managerial skill. Second, because the coefficients
are positive on both timing and picking component, they identify these distinct skills and react to
each.
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4.3.4 Model Predictions
Equation 4.9 generates simple empirical predictions which are depicted in figure 4.1.
The first implication is the link between conditional volatility and subsequent fund flows. Formally
Result 2 For any given | ft|
∂∆qit
∂rit∂Σt+1t
> 0
That is, given the absolute market return | ft|, the sensitivity of flows to fund return is increasing in
conditional volatility.
The intuition for the result is straightforward. Conditional market volatility provides an opportunity
to the manager to showcase his timing skill. This intuition implies that given everything else, with
the rise in conditional volatility, the impact of the learning about timing skill λψ,t on expected
returns and also the sensitivity of flows increases.
Empirical testing of the result requires that the result must be valid for any level of market return.
To this end, I split the sample into two parts. One sample with small | ft| (periods with middle third
ft) and second sample with large | ft| (periods with bottom and top third ft).5 On each sample, I use
following regression equation
FLOWit+1 = ρ0 + ρ1Per fit + ρ2Σt+1
+ρ3[Per fit × Σt+1] + Controlsit + t+1
where Σt+1 is the realized market volatility during t + 1 and is a proxy for the conditional volatility
Σt+1t . I also use Dollar flows to test the hypothesis. Results are presented in the table 4.3. Note that
coefficient on Per fit is positive for all the models suggesting a positive link between performance
and flows. Stand-alone effect of market volatility at time t + 1 which proxies the conditional
volatility Σt+1t in the model is insignificant for all but the first model in Panel A. This is the impact
of market volatility on the level of flows. The term of interest is the interaction between Per fit and
Σt+1. The coefficient is statistically significant and positive in all the models. The model predicts
5Note that market return affect the results only through | ft |.
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this positive link. Note that each model controls the range of absolute market return. Hence, the
negative coefficient implies that for any given level of market return, the sensitivity of flows to
Per fit amplifies as conditional market volatility increases. The coefficient is economically large.
For example consider Panel A. A mere five percentage point (500 bps) rise in conditional volatility
is enough to double the sensitivity of flows to performance.
The second implication is the link between market returns and fund flow sensitivity. Evidence
suggest that market volatility is countercyclical and persistent, For example, (Brandt and Kang,
2004). At the same time, the model implies that investor not only learns more about the timing
skill but also values it more during volatile times. Combining these two statements leads to a
simple hypothesis that sensitivity of fund flows to the performance is asymmetric: greater during
the times with low market returns. Formally,
Result 3
∂∆qit
∂rit
( ft = − f ) > ∂∆qit
∂rit
( ft = f )
The results are presented in the table 4.4. Again Per fit has a positive coefficient. The positive
coefficient on Med ft and Top ft dummy variables indicate that better market returns attract more
capital independent of the fund performance. The coefficient on the interaction terms is of primary
interest. Interaction with Top ft dummy has a negative and economically significant coefficient.
It means that the sensitivity of flows to the performance drops from 48 during Low ft times to
almost 30 during Top ft times. Similar magnitude reduction is observed with percentage flow as a
dependent variable. These results suggest that sensitivity of flows to the performance is counter-
cyclical.
4.4 Conclusion
This paper studies the implications for mutual fund flows when the manager has picking and timing
skill. The paper shows that investors are sophisticated enough to decompose the fund returns into
various components. Second, the model generates implications for flow-sensitivity across volatility
and market cycles. Uncertainty around the mean estimate of timing skill is vast compared to the
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uncertainty around the mean estimate of picking skill. Additionally, given that the timing skill is
more useful during the volatile times and that these are also the times when investor learns a lot
about manager’s timing skill, flows are sensitive to performance during more volatile times. Given
that volatility is counter-cyclical, the sensitivity of flows to performance is higher during low aggre-
gate stock market returns. The paper provides an illustration as to why economic quantities adjust
fast during volatile times. The paper also has a significant bearing on managerial incentives. It
shows that boom periods are characterized by high aggregate flows but diminished flow sensitivity.
So the incentive to outperform during boom periods is reduced as managers attract a substantial
fraction of higher aggregate flows even with a mediocre performance. At the same time, managers
face capital outflow risk during volatile or doom periods due to high flow sensitivity. It would be
an interesting to study managerial risk-taking behavior across market states through the prism of
evidence I show in this paper.
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Figure 4.1: Decomposition of Coefficient on Surprise Return
This graph plots the various components of coefficient of the flows on surprise return yit.
Market return is on X-axis. Following parameterization is used to generate the plot:
σα = 0.114 which is the belief uncertainty about picking skill, σψ = 2.350 which is the
belief uncertainty about timing skill, and σt = 0.168 which is the noise in fund returns
around the mean skill level. Volatility is estimated using following
σt( ft+1) =
√
252 × e−4.60−(4.31× ft)
First row plots component of flow sensitivity specific to changes in α and ψ respectively
which are given by λα = ∆αyit and λψ =
∆ψ
yit
. Second row plots the conditional volatility as a
function of market returns and the resulting coefficient on yit.
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Table 4.1: Conditional Factor Volatility Model
Table presents the estimates for the following conditional volatility model
log(Σt+1t ) = log(a) + κ ft + νt+1
where Σt+1t is computed as realized daily volatility over the next month (t + 1) Factor
considered is market excess return. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis and *, **
and *** denote significance of coefficient at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Because
above model generates estimate of conditional volatility at daily frequency, to generate
annualized conditional volatility, I multiply the estimate by
√
252.
Dependent Variable Log Factor Risk (t+1)
Lagged Market Return -4.312***
(0.868)
Constant -4.601***
(0.032)
N 191
Adj. R-sq 0.158
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Table 4.2: Fund Flow Sensitivity to Components of Fund Returns
The table represents the regression of fund flows on various components of the net fund returns.
The components namely timing, picking and beta exposure are estimated using a factor model in
equation 4.12. Style Growth is the average flow growth over all the funds within same investment
category. Other controls are log of age, log of size, turnover, expense ratio, fund’s return volatility
which is denoted by σ(rit). All the regressions have quarter-year dummies. Standard errors are
clustered at share class level.
Table 4.2: Fund Flow Sensitivity to Components of Fund Returns
Dollar Flows Percentage Flow
Intercept 122.290*** 0.113***
(20.405) (0.007)
ψ̂it × | ft| (Timing Component) 190.326*** 0.248***
(19.229) (0.012)
α̂it (Picking Component) 45.364*** 0.070***
(4.780) (0.003)
β̂it × ft (Beta Component) 66.977* 0.036
(37.170) (0.025)
Risk (t) 471.814 -1.388***
(455.862) (0.277)
Log Size (t) -11.888*** -0.001**
(2.442) (0.000)
Expense Ratio (t) -294.681 -0.771***
(403.239) (0.155)
Age (t) -18.346*** -0.024***
Continued on next page
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Table 4.2 – Continued from previous page
Dollar Flows Percentage Flows
(3.539) (0.001)
Turnover (t) -1.903* -0.002*
(1.127) (0.001)
Style Growth(t+1) 224.070*** 0.111***
(61.235) (0.024)
N 72316 71612
Adj R-sq 0.042 0.087
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Table 4.3: Market Volatility and Flow Sensitivity
The table presents the results of the regression of flows on fund performance and market volatility.
Panel A uses percentage flow definition while Panel B uses Dollar flow definition. In both the
Panels, Per fit is the quarter t normalized rank of a fund within its investment style. Σt+1 is the
realized market volatility during quarter t + 1 and it proxies conditional volatility estimate at time t.
Style Growth is the average flow growth over all the funds within same investment category. Other
controls are the log of age, log of size, turnover, expense ratio, fund’s return volatility which is
denoted by σ(Rit). All the regressions have quarter-year dummies. Standard errors are clustered at
share class level.
Table 4.3: Market Volatility and Flow Sensitivity
Panel A: Percentage Flow Panel B: Dollar Flow
Large | ft| Small | ft| Large | ft| Small | ft|
Intercept 0.138*** 0.055*** 75.646* 78.703***
(0.020) (0.010) (39.816) (18.555)
Per fit 0.042*** 0.045*** 26.032*** 23.299***
(0.004) (0.004) (6.929) (5.558)
Σt+1 -7.950*** 1.753* 1531.778 455.160
(2.257) (0.919) (3922.456) (788.410)
Per fit × Σt+1 0.706*** 1.602*** 938.982** 1235.180**
(0.264) (0.381) (405.919) (482.218)
σ(Rit) -1.311*** -2.641*** 569.453 -214.986
(0.286) (0.350) (497.675) (483.850)
Log Size -0.001** -0.001** -13.687*** -10.721***
(0.001) (0.000) (2.802) (2.404)
Continued on next page
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Table 4.3 – Continued from previous page
Panel A: Percentage Flow Panel B: Dollar Flow
Large | ft| Small | ft| Large | ft| Small | ft|
Expense Ratio -0.780*** -0.786*** -401.864 -221.339
(0.182) (0.166) (436.340) (414.513)
Log Age -0.022*** -0.026*** -16.244*** -20.076***
(0.002) (0.002) (3.634) (3.884)
Turnover -0.002* -0.002* -0.489 -3.045**
(0.001) (0.001) (1.539) (1.181)
Style Growth 0.128*** 0.289*** 251.583*** 261.770***
(0.026) (0.044) (71.531) (57.677)
N 29303 42309 29603 42713
Adj R-Sq 0.106 0.093 0.048 0.040
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Table 4.4: Market Returns and Flow Sensitivity
The table presents the results of the regression of flows on fund performance and market return. In
both the Panels, Per fit is the quarter t normalized rank of a fund within its investment style. Med ft
and Top ft are dummies indicating that market return during time t belong to middle and top third
quintiles as per the historical market return data. A bottom third quintile is a base group. Σt+1 is
the realized market volatility during quarter t + 1 and it proxies conditional volatility estimate at
time t. Style Growth is the average flow growth over all the funds within same investment category.
Other controls are the log of age, log of size, turnover, expense ratio, fund’s return volatility which
is denoted by σ(Rit). All the regressions have quarter-year dummies. Standard errors are clustered
at share class level.
Table 4.4: Market Returns and Flow Sensitivity
Dollar Flows Percentage Flow
Intercept 59.110*** 0.069***
(18.593) (0.009)
Per fit 48.031*** 0.063***
(5.598) (0.003)
Med ft 21.847** -0.011*
(9.006) (0.006)
Top ft 27.918*** 0.016***
(8.469) (0.006)
Per fit ×Med ft -12.895** -0.003
(5.391) (0.003)
Per f × Top ft -18.805*** -0.023***
(5.965) (0.004)
Continued on next page
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Table 4.4 – Continued from previous page
Dollar Flows Percentage Flows
σ(Rit) 432.418 -1.593***
(435.016) (0.274)
Log Size -11.918*** -0.001***
(2.441) (0.000)
Expense Ratio -304.984 -0.800***
(400.633) (0.154)
Log Age -18.451*** -0.024***
(3.541) (0.001)
Turnover -2.114* -0.002**
(1.138) (0.001)
Style Growth 257.590*** 0.164***
(63.286) (0.025)
N 72316 71612
adj. R-sq 0.043 0.098
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
5.1 Summary of the Chapters
The thesis studies three aspects of mutual funds. It shows that the mutual fund’s historical per-
formance is crucial in determining the capital flow patterns for that fund as well manager’s firing
probability given his recent performance. The thesis finds a novel empirical fact that the good-
history funds are more vulnerable to capital outflows after a recent poor performance. The thesis
also presents a theoretical model providing the mechanism to generate the observed capital flow
patterns. The basic conjecture is that the investors differ in their attentiveness, and the fund’s histor-
ical performance determines the average attentiveness of the investors who own it. In equilibrium,
good-history funds are prominently owned by the attentive investors and vice versa. The thesis
also finds that the poor-history funds are more likely to perform poorly in near future. The thesis
also studies aspects of risk-taking from managerial perspective. It studies how fund managers ad-
just the portfolio risk in response to their midyear position. Because, the historical performance
has a bearing on not only the capital flow patterns but also the unemployment risk, it conjectures
that the risk-taking behavior is dependent upon the past performance. It shows using the data that
the good-history funds shift the risk upwards more than the poor-history managers if they are in
a midyear losing position. In absolute terms, good-history managers increase the risk during the
second half of the year in response to the weak midyear performance, but the poor-history funds do
not adjust the risk during the bull years and shift the risk downwards if they are in a midyear losing
position during bear periods. The chapter also presents the evidence that the gap between the risk-
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taking behavior of the good-history and the poor-history managers widens during the bear phases.
In summary, I explore the impact of fund’s historical performance for its capital flow patterns and
risk-shifting by the managers.
The thesis also presents interesting empirical observation that the sensitivity of capital flows to
the recent fund performance is increasing in the conditional volatility of aggregate stock market.
I present a model where investors learn about the managerial picking skill during calm periods
and learn about timing skill during volatile periods. Using the persistence of conditional market
volatility, the model is able to generate asymmetric capital flow sensitivity. To the best of my
knowledge, this is the first study to understand and explain the link between market volatility and
capital flow sensitivity.
118
Appendix A
Proofs
A.1 Proofs For Chapter II
Proof of lemma 1
Consider equilibrium condition given in equation 2.7. Substituting rt+1 from equation 2.6 and
taking expectation on both the sides we get
htφt − f − ηh2t qt = 0
and solving for qt we get
qt =
(ht × φt) − f
ηh2t
Substituting this expression for qt in revenue maximization problem for the manager, we get
L = f ×
[
ht × φt − f
ηh2t
]
Taking first order conditions, we get
− fφt
ηh2t
+
2 f 2
ηh3t
= 0
and solving for ht, we get
ht =
2 f
φt
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Given fixed f , it can be seen that optimal ht is only dependent upon φt. Hence I denote it by h(φt).
This is non-negative as far as fixed fee is non-negative and φt > 0.
Proof of lemma 2
Using Bayesian Formula
φt+1 = φt + (Rt+1 − φt)
(
σ2t
σ2t + σ
2
ε
)
Consider definition of net returns
rt+1 = htRt+1 − f − ηh2t qt
Taking expectations,
Et(rt+1) = htφt − f − ηh2t qt
Backing out Rt+1 from net return equation and backing out φt from expected net return equation,
we get following for Rt+1 − φt
Rt+1 − φt = rt+1ht +
f
ht
+ ηhtqt −
(
Et(rt+1)
ht
+
f
ht
+ ηhtqt
)
=
rt+1 − Et(rt+1)
ht
(A.1)
Substituting in Bayesian formula, we get
φt+1 = φt +
(
rt+1 − Et(rt+1)
ht
) (
σ2t
σ2t + σ
2
ε
)
(A.2)
In competitive equilibrium, Et(rt+1) = 0. Which leads to update formula.
Proof of lemma 5
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As f is fixed, revenue is maximized by maximizing qt. Note that
q ≡ q̂t − zt
is the lower bound on fund size at time t as there is no more attentive capital left to flow out. Let
Ht(Ωt) =
{
ht ≥ 0|qt = q∗t > q
}
be the set of ht ≥ 0 for which optimal size is greater than lower
bound. If Ht = ∅, then any ht ≥ 0 generates same revenue and any ht ≥ 0 is optimal. Suppose
Ht , ∅. Then any policy ht ∈ Ht is better than ht < Ht. Further h∗t = 2 fφt ∈ Ht. If not, then ∃h
′
t ∈ Ht
such that f × qt(Ωt, h′t) > f × qt(Ωt, h∗t ) which contradicts that h∗t is optimal within competitive set
up with δ = 1. As h∗t ∈ Ht, using lemma 1, we know that h∗t is the optimal policy even in this case.
Proof of lemma 6
Using definition of net returns and taking expectations we have
Et (rt+1) = φtht − f − ηh2t qt
Using qt = q∗t (1 + ψt) we get
Et (rt+1) = φtht − f − ηh2t q∗t (1 + ψt)
= φtht − f − ηh2t q∗t + ηh2t q∗t ψt
By definition of competitive equilibrium size, q∗t is such that expected net return is zero. That is
φtht − f − ηh2t q∗t = 0
This gives us
Et (rt+1) = −ηh2t q∗t ψt (A.3)
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Proof of lemma 7
Define fund flows as Define Fund flows (FFt) by
FFt =
qt
qt−1(1 + rt)
− 1 (A.4)
This definition is identical to one tested in empirical section. Now consider a fund with Ωt, ht−1
and ψt−1. Suppose rt is such that q∗t can be achieved as zt > |e∗t |. In that case qt = q∗t . Using
equation 2.10, we have
q∗t =
φ2t
4η f
. Substituting q∗t and q∗t and using qt−1 = q∗t−1(1 + ψt−1), and denoting
σ2t−1
σ2t−1+σ
2
ε
= ωt−1, we get
FFt =
φ2t
φ2t−1(1 + ψt−1)(1 + rt)
− 1
Now substituting the expression for φt in terms of φt−1 using Bayesian Update we get
FFt =
(
φt−1 + ωt−1(rt−Et−1(rt))ht−1
)2
φ2t−1(1 + ψt−1)
− 1
Finally substituting for ht−1 from equation 2.9 and Et−1(rt) from equation A.3, and simplifying we
get
FFt =
(
φt−1 +
ωt−1(rt+ηh2t−1q∗t−1ψt−1)
ht−1
)2
φ2t−1(1 + ψt−1)(1 + rt)
− 1
Simplifying above expression we get FFt in case where qt = q∗t
FFt =
1
(1 + ψt−1)(1 + rt)
[
1 + ωt−1
(
rt
2 f
+
ψt−1
2
)]2
− 1 (A.5)
In the other case where e∗t < 0 and zt < |e∗t |, capital outflows equal zt. In that case percentage capital
flows are given by
FFt = − ztqt−1(1 + rt) (A.6)
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A.2 Proofs For Chapter IV
Proof of lemma 8
Using equation 4.3
rit+1 = αi + ψi f 2t+1 + εit+1 −
1
η
qit
Taking expectations and setting it to zero gives
Et (rit+1) = 0
=⇒ Et
(
αi + ψi f 2t+1 + εit+1 −
1
η
qit
)
= αit + ψitΣ
t+1
t −
1
η
qit = 0
Solving for qit we get
qit = η
(
αit + ψitΣ
t+1
t
)
Proof of lemma 9
Using equation 4.8 and subtracting equations at t + 1 and t we get
qit − qit−1 = η
(
αit − αit−1 + ψitΣt+1t − ψit−1Σtt−1
)
= η
(
∆αit + ∆ψitΣ
t+1
t + ψit−1∆Σt+1t
)
where second line is obtained by adding and subtracting ψitΣt+1t . Using equation 4.5 and ∆αit =
λα,trit and using equation 4.6, ∆ψit = λψ,trit. Substituting this in the expression for fund flows we
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get
qit − qit−1 = η
[(
λα,t + λψ,tΣ
t+1
t
)
rit + ψit−1∆Σt+1t
]
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